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The Sports Lawyer's Duty to Avoid
Differing Interests: A Practical Guide
to Responsible Representation
by ROBERT E. FRALEY*
and F. RUSSELL HARWELL**
Introduction
American professional athletes have not always sought per-
sonal representation. Indeed, the "sports agent,"1 the best
known representative of sports personalities, 2 has gained
prominence only in the past two decades.' Players' increasing
reliance on representatives-primarily in connection with
player contract negotiations-is directly traceable to several
developments.
* B.S. 1975, J.D. 1979, University of Alabama; LL.M. 1980, University of Flor-
ida. The author, of Fraley & Associates, P.A., in Orlando, Florida, serves as counsel
for various professional and amateur sports interests, including players, coaches, and
teams.
** B.A. 1986, University of Alabama. Member, Third Year Class, University of
Alabama School of Law.
1. A sports agent serves the role of agents in other areas generally. Such per-
sons act for, or in the place of, another by authority from him or represent another
in contractual negotiations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). Sports
agents are not the focus of this Article, yet are mentioned in various places, due to
the common overlap of the roles of lawyers and agents. For a more detailed look at
sports agents, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS §§ 3.17-3.19 (1979);
Sobel, The Regulation of Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. REV.
701 (1987); Note, Regulation of Sports Agents: Since at First It Hasn't Succeeded, Try
Federal Legislation, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (1988); Comment, The Agent-Athlete Rela-
tionship in Professional and Amateur Sports: The Inherent Potential for Abuse and
the Need for Regulation, 30 BUFFALO L. REV. 815 (1981); Neff, Den of Vipers, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, at 74.
2. While this Article frequently refers to professional athletes in the three ma-
jor team sports of football, basketball, and baseball, agents represent athletes in
every professional sport, and frequently, other professional sports personalities such
as coaches.
3. One earlier appearance of the sports agent was in 1925, when legendary foot-
ball player Red Grange, with negotiation help from his "manager" Charles C. "Cash
and Carry" Pyle, signed a $100,000 contract with the National Football League's Chi-
cago Bears. See Ruxin, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Student Athlete, the NCAA,
and Agents, 8 J. C. & U. L. 347 (1981-82) (quoting M. PACHTER, CHAMPIONS OF AMER-
ICAN SPORT 266 (1981)).
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The invalidation of reserve and option clauses4 in profes-
sional sports player contracts may be viewed as one event
which spurred on professional representation of athletes.'
Players enjoy increased bargaining leverage since they are no
longer "perpetually bound to their teams."'6 The emergence of
rival leagues and the subsequent bidding for available talent7
also contribute to players' reliance on representatives. Addi-
4. Inclusion of a clause in a standard player contract entitling the team to a
one-year renewal is commonly referred to as an option clause, while provisions giv-
ing the team perpetual rights to the player's services are categorized as reserve
clauses. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.12, at 283.
5.' Attorneys representing athletes are variously labeled as "sports lawyers,"
"sports attorneys," or "attorney-agents." Lawyers serving the same roles as agents
are often incorrectly labeled "sports agents." But see infra note 79 (some lawyers,
when entering this field, expressly attempt to segregate the roles of agent and law-
yer). For the purposes of this Article, members of the legal profession working on
legal matters in the sports domain are "sports lawyers." The definition of sports law
covers a multitude of areas, including labor law issues, rules and regulations of ama-
teur sports, constitutional issues, personal injury litigation, and even copyright law.
See Hochberg, Sports Law, Anyone?, SPORTS INC., Aug. 15, 1988, at 44-45 (discussing
the difficulty in defining sports law, because the area is really an amalgam of various
legal disciplines). The sports lawyer, as used in this Article, encompasses one of the
more well-known areas of sports law: the personal representation of professional
athletes and other personalities. This particular area of work on occasion will be
referred to as the "representation industry," lawyers or agents representing those
athletes in the three major team sports, and the numerous other professional sports.
6. Sobel, supra note 1, at 704 (citing Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). This right of a team to
renew a player's contract without the player's consent at the end of its original term
was often rejected in the mid-1970's on antitrust grounds. See, e.g., Robertson v.
NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). Such
litigation spurred "more serious bargaining between the club owners and the play-
ers, and the consequence of these negotiations has been that contract renewal
clauses have either been eliminated or rewritten to specifically provide for a single
year renewal." J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.12, at 285.
7. The most flamboyant bidding for available talent may have been between
the National Football League (NFL) and the now-defunct United States Football
League (USFL). It was not uncommon during the 1983 and 1984 seasons for teams
in both leagues to offer million dollar salaries. See, e.g., M. TROPE, NECESSARY
ROUGHNESS 10 (1987) (The author, a- former sports agent, states that, following the
birth of the USFL in 1983, the "marketplace changed drastically." Trope negotiated
a $7.3 million contract with the New York Giants of the NFL for star Lawrence
Taylor, who had secretly signed a long-term contract with rival team owner Donald
Trump and his team, the New Jersey Generals of the USFL.). Prior to the 1980's
other rival leagues undoubtedly began the trend towards the use of player represent-
atives. See, e.g., Detroit Football Co. v. Robinson, 186 F. Supp. 933, 934 (E.D. La.
1960), off'd, 283 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1960) (rivalry for talent between the NFL and old
American Football League "but another round in the sordid fight for football play-
ers"); Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc. v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir.
1969) (dispute over player Rick Barry's contract between teams of the National Bas-
ketball Association (NBA) and old American Basketball Association).
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tionally, the increase in televised coverage of sporting events
has caused the sports industry to approach the larger business
of entertainment in terms of public appeal.' As a result, ath-
letes are now in a position to earn additional income from
other sources, most notably product endorsements.9
The growing use of the agent has directly impacted amateur
and professional sports. Professional athletes now command
higher salaries than ever,10 with the agent responsible for a
portion of the increase." Agents do not merely serve to in-
crease players' salaries; they assist in a multitude of areas such
as managing a player's income, 12 procuring product endorse-
ment income,'3 and generally allowing athletes to concentrate
on their athletic performance instead of their off-the-field
pursuits. 4
The rise of the agent has also indirectly affected the legal
profession. Although agent representation has provided many
benefits, it has caused considerable damage to numerous inter-
ests, primarily those of the athlete. 5 Fraudulent "investment
8. G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAw 126 (1986) (radio and
television, including cable and pay television, provide for expanded viewing audi-
ences, increasing the popularity and salaries of athletes; "Players, like actors in the
entertainment industry, have become the focus of much of this media attention, and
like their acting counterparts, they have come to expect compensation for their per-
sonality status as well as for their athletic performance." Id.).
9. Endorsements for sports clients could present a lawyer with a potential con-
flict of interest. See infra notes 111-24 and 'accompanying text. Other reasons for
the emergence of the player representative are (1) the increase in player salaries
caused a need for tax planners in the negotiation process, and (2) the "metamorpho-
sis" of players associations into true labor unions. Sobel, supra note 1, at 704.
10. For example, in 1987, the top 100 income earners in sports averaged over
$1,400,000, a dramatic increase from the previous four years. See The 100 Highest-
Paid Athletes, SPORT, June 1988, at 23. Also, in the six years from 1982 to 1988, the
number of millionaire sports personalities went from 23 to 118. Sport 100: Who
Makes What in Sports, SPORT, June 1988, at 23.
11. See, e.g., Bulkely, Sports Agents Help Athletes Win-and Keep-Those Super
Salaries, Wall St. J., Mar. 25, 1985, at 31, col. 4.
12. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 111-24 and accompanying text (agent may, depending on cli-
ent's market potential, engage in procuring product endorsements).
14. "[P]layer agents are now generally accepted as a permanent, highly visible,
and at times positively beneficial, element in the sports labor relations process." IN-
QUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R. REP. No. 94, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1977) [hereinafter
INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS]. See generally R. RUXIN, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE
TO AGENTS 17-21 (1982).
15. In defense of sports agents, an effort has been made to improve their ethical
standards in representation. The Association of Representatives of Professional
Athletes (ARPA), founded in 1978, has a Code of Ethics and an organized continuing
1989]
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advice"'16 and "overly aggressive client recruitment practices"'17
by agents, particularly the "early signings" of eligible student-
athletes of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), have harmed athletes at various stages in their ca-
reers.' Conservative estimates of early signings indicate that
they are running rampant.19 Sports agents contribute not only
to the cutting short of athletes' collegiate careers but also to
embarrassing academic institutions. 0
education program. ARPA addresses many of the same issues as the various ethical
codes of the legal profession. See ARPA CODE OF ETHICS, reprinted in G. SCHUBERT,
R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 8, at 284-90 [hereinafter ARPA CODE OF ETH-
ICS]. The primary criticism of these efforts centers on the problem of enforceability.
See Sobel, supra note 1, at 723 (noting that because ARPA membership is not legally
required of agents, the ARPA Code of Ethics is not effective in remedying inadequa-
cies of the law in deterring abuses by sports agents).
16. See, e.g., Papanek, A Lot of Hurt: Inaction Got Kareem Creamed, SPORTS IL-
LUSTRATED, Oct. 19, 1987, at 89-96 (describing how NBA star Kareem Abdul-Jabaar,
after signing a broad representation agreement with sports agent Tom Collins,
charged Collins with improprieties ranging from breach of fiduciary duty to negli-
gent misrepresentation for allegedly lending huge sums of his money to other play-
ers, and entering partnerships with personal liability for the entire investment). See
generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.17, at 320 n.705 (reporting a
case of an agent misappropriating his client's money and pleading guilty to seven
counts of grand larceny).
17. Sobel, supra note 1, at 714.
18. The NCAA is a voluntary organization made up of most major collegiate in-
stitutions across the country. Rules of that association, which bind all member-
schools, state that athletes may not enter into any type of agreement with agents or
lawyers for the marketing of the individual's athletic skills, prior to the expiration of
that individual's eligibility to participate in college athletics. See infra notes 140-44
and accompanying text.
19. It has been estimated that over one-half of the top NFL prospects every year
have signed such agreements before their college eligibility has expired. See Ban-
non, Ex-agent: 80% Sign in School, USA Today, Dec. 17, 1987, at C1, col. 4 (quoting
various sports agents in their estimates of how many of the top 330 senior college
football players usually have accepted money from agents or signed with them prior
to ending their eligibility). See also M. TROPE, supra.note 7, at 77 (Former sports
agent Mike Trope claims that, during his time as an agent, about 60 percent of the
players drafted by the NFL in the first three rounds had "made a commitment, in
one form or another, to an agent before their senior season ended."); R. RUXIN,
supra note 14, at 35-36 (reporting that 60 to 75% of NFL draftees had made agent
commitments prior to NCAA eligibility expiration).
One can only imagine the degree of contact with amateur athletes that does not
result in an actual signed representation agreement. See, e.g., Powers, Coaches, Ath-
letes Are Artful Hustlers, Too, SPORTING NEwS, Nov. 16, 1987, at 12 (Sports agents
Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom "crisscrossed the country for the last two years,
making pitches to virtually every football player they thought might go in the first
three rounds of the NFL draft.").
20. The NCAA imposes a number of penalties on both athletes and their institu-
tions for unauthorized contact between eligible athletes and agents. Athletes have
been ruled ineligible for future amateur competition, while penalties levied against
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One agent was convicted in a state court for tampering with
a sporting event.21 Two other agents were federally indicted
on mail fraud, racketeering and conspiracy to commit extor-
tion charges.22 The latter case, which arose from two agents'
dealings with some 44 student-athletes, has been characterized
as "one of the most significant indictments ever involving
American sports. ' 23  The two agents, formerly in the en-
universities have included forfeitures of team victories and tournament winnings.
See, e.g., Horn, Intercollegiate Athletes: Waning Amateurism and Rising Profession-
alism, 5 J. C. & U. L. 97, 98 (1978) (Villanova University forfeited its 1971 runner-up
finish in the NCAA Basketball Tournament as one of its players, Howard Porter,
signed an agency agreement prior to the season's end.). The University of Alabama,
for example, was forced to relinquish $250,000 in NCAA post-season basketball win-
nings in 1987 after playing two ineligible players, both of whom had signed represen-
tation agreements with sports agents. The NCAA ruled that one of the players,
Derrick McKey, was ineligible for the remainder of his college career. See infra
note 21. Additionally, the recent highly-publicized indictment of sports agents
Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom involved many academic institutions whose athletes
were involved with the agents. These institutions included Southern Methodist Uni-
versity, University of Pittsburgh, University of Kentucky, University of Texas, Uni-
versity of Iowa, and Temple University. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying
text.
21. See Mortensen, Walters Will Go on Trial Today, Alabama Prosecutor:
'We're Going to Show These Agents,' Atlanta Const., May 9, 1988, at D1, col. 5;
Mortensen, Walters, Alabama Negotiate: Agent to Repay $200,000, Atlanta Const.,
May 10, 1988, at El, col. 2 (both describing indictments and the subsequent settle-
ment of New York agent Norby Walters on charges brought by the state of Alabama
for commercial bribery, deceptive trade practices, and tampering with a sports con-
test, resulting from his and partner Lloyd Bloom's dealings with University of Ala-
bama basketball players Derrick McKey and Terry Coner). A settlement followed
the Alabama conviction (which was later overturned on appeal) of agent Jim Aber-
nethy for tampering with a sports contest, and the plea bargain of Bloom for the
misdemeanor charge of deceptive trade practices. See Scorecard, Soft Time, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 23, 1988, at 13. Commentators have stated that, although the
state's attempts to keep unscrupulous agents away from college athletics is to be
commended, the sentence chosen for Bloom-washing state trooper cars for one
week-was "laugh[able]." The sentence chosen should have been more closely asso-
ciated with the charge, such as performing community services. Id
22. See Grand Jury Indictment, United States v. Walters & Bloom, No. 88-CR-
709 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 24, 1988) [hereinafter Walters Indictment]. New York sports
agents Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom were indicted following a seventeen month
investigation by the FBI. The standard sales pitch of the agents was an offer of
between $2500 and $5000 cash up front, followed by monthly payments of $250, in
return for the exclusive right to represent the players when they turned profes-
sional. Id. The grand jury also charged sports agent David Lueddeke with perjury
and obstruction of justice. See Grand Jury Indictment, United States v. Lueddeke,
No. 88-CR-709 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 24, 1988).
23. Selcraig, The Deal Went Sour: Sports Agents Norby Walters and Lloyd
Bloom Were Indicted for Racketeering and Extortion, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5,
1988, at 32.
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tertainment industry, piloted a "kamikaze" 24 venture into
sports representation, including enlisting the help of a reputed
organized crime family to threaten student-athletes.25  This
type of behavior has led to an onslaught of legislation seeking
to regulate sports agents.26
These incidents have damaged the reputations of those in
the representation industry. Athletes, in choosing a represen-
tative, are increasingly turning to lawyers to perform serv-
ices27 formerly provided by agents. Over fifty percent of those
actively involved as representatives in the three major profes-
sional sports leagues are lawyers. 28 An even higher percent-
age of America's top football players use lawyers as
representatives.
29
24. Id.
25. Walters Indictment, supra note 22, at 3-6. The indictment includes numer-
ous references to organized crime figure Michael Franzese, who was used by the
agents to threaten wayward clients with physical harm. When several athletes, fol-
lowing the signing of a representation agreement with the agents, attempted to can-
cel the relationship, the agents were said to have made threats to "break the legs" of
the athletes. See id. at 54 (quoting agent Lloyd Bloom, upon learning of University
of Texas football player Everett Gay's retaining another agent, as saying that "we
can get someone from Vegas to come down to see that Everett Gay doesn't play
football again"). See also id. at 53 (Bloom telling University of Iowa football player
Ronald Morris that payments made to Morris were from "bigger backers" from Los
Angeles who "don't care about what they do," including blowing up the house of
Morris' new agent).
26. Up until several years ago, the sports agent was largely unregulated. See
Comment, supra note 1, at 828-30. Spurred by the conduct of several agents, in par-
ticular Norby Walters, Lloyd Bloom, and Jim Abernethy, some eighteen states have
enacted legislation requiring agents (anyone serving in that role) to be certified. See
generally Sobel, supra note 1, at 724; Kohn, Sports Agents Representing Professional
Athletes: Being Certified Means Never Having to Say You're Qualified, 5 ENT. &
SPORTS LAw. 1 (1988). As of December 1988, these states, while passing the laws,
have generally not- verified compliance and provided enforcement.
27. Attorneys typically begin their services with professional sports contract ne-
gotiation, and follow with other legal services including estate planning, negotiation
for insurance protection, investment advice, and counseling the athlete about careers
after sports.
28. Of the 227 representatives registered with the National Basketball Players
Association (NBPA) and the NBPA Committee on Agent Registration and Regula-
tion, 134 (59%) indicate that they are members of the legal profession. Information
provided by Lori Weisman, Administrative Assistant to the NBPA (Aug. 1, 1988).
29. The top 10 draft choices in the National Football League from 1985-88 se-
lected attorneys as agents 78% (31 of 40) of the time. Information provided by Mike
Duberstein, Director of Research, National Football League Players Association
(Aug. 1, 1988).
Major league baseball provides another example of this movement. "There has
been an increasing move over the past five years for players to be represented by
attorneys. Out of the 150 people that are currently representing players, between 50
and 60 percent actually are attorneys. Out of the 25 people that represent the major-
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This shift toward the legal profession is likely to cause
fierce competition among lawyers paralleling the existing
competition among non-lawyer sports agents. This scenario
requires lawyers to pay special attention to the ethical rules of
the legal profession.
This Article will examine the sports lawyer and one ethical
rule: the obligation to avoid conflicts of interest. Numerous
examples of conflicts of interest in sports representation, as in
the legal profession generally,30 exist. Sports lawyers cur-
rently work for management firms31 that not only provide per-
sonal representation to athletes, but also invent and organize
sporting events in which those athletes appear.3 2 Additionally,
lawyers have simultaneously represented a professional league
players association in collective bargaining with management,
and individual members of that players union. 3
This Article, while emphasizing lawyers and the various
ethical mandates of the legal profession, also has general ap-
plicability to the sports agent, who, as a fiduciary under
agency law, remains bound by conflict of interest standards.3 4
Part I of this Article details the rules of ethics35 and reviews
ity of the players, even a larger percentage are attorneys." Telephone interview
with Arthur Shack, Counsel to the Major League Baseball Players Association (July
21, 1988).
Additionally, the number of attorneys bringing suit on behalf of defrauded ath-
letes has increased. See Neff, supra note 1, at 76 (noting that San Francisco attorney
Ed King has made a lucrative practice out of suing agents and advisers who de-
frauded athletes, and quoting King: "If the worst you can say about one of [the
agents] is that he is incompetent, that probably puts him among the top five percent
in the sports business").
30. See infira note 36.
31. These firms provide athlete-clients with multiple "in-house" services, includ-
ing the negotiation of player contracts, financial services (such as budgeting and in-
vestment advice), and other services. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
Although there are currently three large sports management firms, the number of
sports management firms has increased markedly. See infra note 152.
32. See infra notes 150-79 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
35. Analysis will focus primarily on the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter ABA CODE] and the
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES], in-
cluding comments to the rules, as applied to the sports representation industry. For
general purposes, the various ABA Code provisions and their significance should be
mentioned. Nine Canons make up the Code; each Canon expresses standards of pro-
fessional behavior required of attorneys. Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary
Rules are derived from each Canon. An Ethical Consideration represents the ethical
goals toward which all lawyers should strive, while a Disciplinary Rule is mandatory
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a noted conflict of interest case involving basic fiduciary prin-
ciples. Part II outlines and discusses examples of conflicts of
interest in sports representation. These include representa-
tion of sports clients with competing team and endorsement
interests, the inherent conflicts in fee arrangements, advising
the amateur athlete without jeopardizing amateur status, play-
ers association representation, event management, and the
representation of both coaches and players. Part III of the Ar-
ticle offers a set of guidelines for practicing sports lawyers and
agents to avoid conflict of interest problems. The Article con-
cludes by proposing that the most efficient manner for sports
lawyers and agents to avoid damaging conflicts of interest is a
self-enforced narrowing of the scope of their representation of
multiple clients.
I
Lawyer's Duty to Avoid Conflict of Interest
Conflicts of interest have been described as one of the most
troublesome problems facing the legal profession. 6 Although
other ethical issues may be more prevalent in sports represen-
tation,37 representing conflicting interests remains at the fore-
front in the sports area, as in the legal profession generally.38
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules), lawyers are forced to decline representation of a client
if (1) that representation will be directly adverse to another
client, or (2) the lawyer's personal interests "materially limit"
and establishes a minimum level of ethical conduct required to avoid disciplinary
sanctions. See generally Kutak, A Commitment to Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A. J.
804 (1982).
36. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 313 (1986). See also Comment, Devel-
opments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1244, 1247 (1981) (stating that "[flrom 1908 to the present, the lawyer with conflict-
ing interests has provided bench and bar with one of the toughest problems in legal
ethics"). See generally Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representa-
tion of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Contro-
versy, 61 TEx. L. REV. 211 (1982); O'Dea, The Lawyer-Client Relationship
Reconsidered: Methods for Avoiding Conflicts of Interest, Malpractice Liability, and
Disqualification, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693 (1980).
37. For example, the issue of in-person client solicitation is consistently dis-
cussed as an abuse by sports lawyers. Members of the legal profession, unlike sports
agents, are forbidden from recommending themselves for legal employment to a pro-
spective client when that client has not sought advice. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 35,
Rule 7.3; ABA CODE, supra note 35, DR 2-103(A).
38. For sources discussing conflicts in the sports representation area, see infra
note 98.
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his responsibilities to the client.39 The discussion in the fol-
lowing section examines the conflict of interest mandates
which face the sports lawyer-both from the perspective of
the policy behind the rules, and the rules themselves.
A. Underlying Policy Considerations: Loyalty and
Confidentiality
The basis of the conflict of interest rules is that a lawyer
must provide a client with unmitigated loyalty throughout the
representation.40  This "zealous" 41 loyalty is an essential ele-
ment of the lawyer's responsibility to a client.42 However, var-
ious interests in the sports context 43 may impair the requisite
vigorous representation.
The principle of confidentiality is an equally important un-
derpinning of the conflict of interest rules.44 The attorney-cli-
ent privilege assures clients confidentiality, and thus
encourages individuals to seek legal services.45 Representation
of adverse interests may threaten the free flow of information,
which serves as the primary purpose of the attorney-client
privilege,46 since confidential information received from one
39. See infra text accompanying note 68 for full text of the rule.
40. Canon 5 of the ABA Code requires the attorney to maintain undivided loy-
alty, while advising each client of his best course of action. ABA CODE, supra note
35, EC 5-1 reads:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromis-
ing influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of
other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute
his loyalty to his client.
41. ABA CODE, supra note 35, EC 7-1 ("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client
and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the
law .... ).
42. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.7 comment.
43. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
44. See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 316; L. PATTERSON & E.
CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF LAw 229 (1971). The attorney has an obligation to
protect these confidences, defined by the ABA Code as information protected by the
attorney-client privilege. The obligation includes protecting "secrets," defined as
"other information gained in the professional relationship." ABA CODE, supra note
35, DR 4-101(A). See also MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.6 (lawyer must not
reveal information related to the representation of a client, absent consent, or those
disclosures "impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation").
45. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 35, Rule 1.6 comment ("The observance of the
ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client
not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of
the client but also encourages people to seek early legal assistance.").
46. See id The confidentiality requirement is a fundamental principle in the
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client may be used to that client's disadvantage when the law-
yer is representing a third party.47
Although other issues have been raised as to what consti-
tutes a conflict, 4 breaches of loyalty and confidentiality are
the two primary issues for lawyers to consider. Either of these
conflicts of interest may arise at any time during the represen-
tation of a client.
B. Confidentiality in Sports: Varying Policies
While confidentiality is a major consideration in the area of
legal ethics, it is relatively insignificant in sports representa-
tion. This results from the nature of the practice.
Lawyers in sports representation often play the same roles
as agents, primarily negotiating the athlete's playing contract.
The mere fact that lawyers act as agents is not a sufficient
reason to alter the confidentiality rules. Non-lawyer agents
are obligated not to disclose information gained in the rela-
tionship with an athlete if "the athlete has requested [it] to be
held confidential or... the [agent] knows or should know [it]
would be embarrassing or detrimental to the athlete if re-
leased."49 Nevertheless, most information that an agent learns
in a relationship with an athlete will not remain strictly confi-
dential. Even if the client requests confidentiality, the media
often discover and disclose contract information.
Contract negotiations may encompass the agent's entire re-
client-lawyer relationship and encourages clients to "communicate fully and frankly
with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter."
47. See Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification" The Role of Presump-
tion and Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996, 997-98 (1979) (stating that in the course of
representing interests adverse to a former client, an attorney may, despite conscien-
tious attempts to resist, subconsciously or inadvertently use his former client's confi-
dences against the client).
48. For example, the broad language of Canon 9 of the ABA Code to avoid "even
the appearance of impropriety" is often asserted in these situations to claim lawyer
disqualification because of a conflict. The Model Rules, however, omitted this state-
ment as a means of attorney disqualification. Additionally, such a standard has been
widely criticized. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 320-23 (questioning the identity
of observers for whom the appearance of impropriety must be avoided and whether
it is possible to measure an observer's perception of propriety or impropriety). See
also Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the Fed-
eral Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REv. 243, 264-65 (1981) (calling
Canon 9 a "dangerous and vague standard" which disqualifies counsel based on ap-
pearances alone and suggesting that the Canon 9 standard often turns on how differ-
ent judges suppose that the public might view a given ethical issue, which perception
is often in contrast to legitimate concerns of the Bar).
49. ARPA CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 15, Rule 4-102.
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lationship with an athlete.50 While information regarding sal-
ary or other terms of employment is generally confidential, 1
these facts are often publicly disseminated by sources other
than the lawyer. 2 This information then becomes part of the
"public domain" and thus is beyond the control of the
lawyer.53
While the public availability of this information does not re-
quire normal confidentiality, many services provided by a
sports lawyer will still require strict confidentiality.' Gener-
ally, the more akin the sports lawyer's services are to tradi-
tional legal services, the more likely that confidentiality rules
50. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.19, at 331 (agent may be
appointed for limited purpose of negotiating the athlete's contract with his club, with
the termination date of the agent-player relationship set).
51. Information gained in a professional relationship will either be labeled
broadly as a "secret," see supra note 45, or as falling within the narrower attorney-
client privilege. The general requirements for invoking the privilege are as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except when the protection is
waived. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (1961). The privilege promotes free con-
sultation of legal advisers, allowing an unlimited flow of information between attor-
ney and client, and enabling the attorney to give informed legal advice. Id. at § 2291.
52. When an agent completes a negotiation, the news media frequently report
details of an athlete's playing contract, such as the amount of the signing bonus,
yearly salary, and incentive clauses. Other income sources, such as product endorse-
ments and commercials, are routinely reported. Additionally, players salaries are
compared. This is illustrated by reports of the furor in major league baseball over
the alleged collusion of the club owners in setting player salaries during the mid-
1980's. The New York Times reported the income (including base pro-rated share of
signing bonus) of all major league baseball players following the 1988 season. See
Chass, Baseball Pay is Reaching Upper Deck, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1988, at Y53, col. 3.
53. "Our position is that when an attorney claims, for example, that he has con-
fidentiality to protect a player's salary information, that this is not allowed. Our
stance is that his claim on confidentiality grounds is not a legal matter-it is simply
part of the agent rules that such information must be divulged." Telephone inter-
view with Mike Duberstein, NFLPA Director of Research (July 21, 1988). Negoti-
ated contracts are customarily filed with the various players associations, which
prevent a lawyer or agent from attempting to keep such information confidential.
See, e.g., Forbes, Vikings Base Their Salaries on Loads of Incentive Clauses, USA
Today, Dec. 14, 1988, at C3, col. 2 (reporting that the NFLPA distributed its annual
salary survey in 1988, despite the refusal of the Management Council, made up of
club owners, to disclose these player contracts).
54. For example, an area such as estate planning for a sports client would re-
quire lawyers to obey confidentiality standards. Unlike confidentiality, the principle
of loyalty, see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text, as related to conflict of in-
terest is not subject to the alterations due to the nature of the sports representation
industry.
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will apply.55 If the lawyer has not been appointed by the ath-
lete for some limited purpose, the majority of information
gained during representation, whether or not from salary ne-
gotiations, remains confidential.m
C. 1969 ABA Code: Lawyers Must Avoid Representing
"Conflicting" or "Differing" Interests
The basic duty of a lawyer is to exercise independent profes-
sional judgment on behalf of a client. Canon 6 of the 1908 Ca-
nons of Ethics initially set the standard by stating that it was
"unprofessional to represent conflicting interests."57 Discipli-
nary Rule 5-105(A) of the 1969 ABA Code similarly forbids
representing clients who would adversely affect the lawyer's
independent judgment; the actual wording employed, though,
has been changed to "differing interests. '5 8 A differing inter-
est is defined as "every interest that will adversely affect
either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client,
whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other
interest. '59
Conflicts may arise in several situations. For example, a for-
mer or new client may present an interest that conflicts with a
current client's interest under DR 5-105. Moreover, a lawyer's
personal interests may clash with those of a client. The ABA
Code states that the latter coriflict arises if the lawyer's pro-
fessional judgment on behalf of his client "will be or reason-
ably may be affected by his own financial, business, property,
or personal interests."60
A conflict violation under the ABA Code generally disquali-
55. For types of services typically provided by sports lawyers, see supra note 27.
56. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
57. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, Canon 6 (1908).
58. ABA CODE, supra note 35, DR 5-105(A). The provision provides in full:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely
to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or
if it would be likely to involve him representing differing interests, except
to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C) [the provision allowing the rep-
resentation to continue on disclosure and client consent if it is obvious that
each client can be adequately represented].
59. Id.
60. ABA CODE, supra note 35, DR 5-101(A). The provision provides in full:
(A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on
behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own finan-
cial, business, property, or personal interests.
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fies a law firm or solo practitioner, although such a result is
arguably not required in every case.6 ' Case law varies as to
which of the clients the lawyer may continue to represent; the
lawyer may not have the choice.62
D. 1983 Model Rules: Clarification With "Directly Adverse"
Standard
The drafters of the Model Rules recognized several "defi-
ciencies" 63 in the 1969 ABA Code and omitted the ambiguous
"appearance of impropriety" rubric.64 That standard has been
criticized for various reasons, one being that the supposed pub-
lic perception of a given ethical issue may be in contrast with a
legitimate concern of the Bar.65
The Model Rules suggest when a lawyer should seek a cli-
ent's consent if a potential conflict of interest exists.66 Under
the Model Rules, lawyers must "reasonably believe" that the
representation of a client will not be adversely affected be-
cause of a conflict of interest. The Model Rules, however, al-
low such a representation to continue if the client or clients
"consento after consultation. '67 The main conflict of interest
proviso is Model Rule 1.7, which gauges concurrent represen-
tation issues by a "directly adverse" standard. The rule pro-
vides as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client will be directly adverse to another client,
unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not adversely affect the relationship with the other
client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
61. See, e.g., Miller & Warren, Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Issues for the
Inside and Outside Counsel, 40 Bus. LAW. 631, 658 (1985) (stating that disqualifica-
tion is a matter of discretion and equity, with the relevant considerations including
whether a party waived its right to such relief by delaying and permitting the attor-
ney to represent other clients well into the course of a matter).
62. See, e.g., Estates Theatres v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 345 F. Supp. 93,
100 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). See also IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that
if the second client is dissatisfied with and unwilling to consent to the joint represen-
tation, the attorney must cease representing the first client).
63. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 315. For an outline of the MODEL RULES'
departures from the ABA CODE, see id. at 315-16.
64. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 35, Rules 1.7-1.13.
65. See supra note 48.
66. See C. WOLFRnAM, supra note 36, at 340-41.
67. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 35, Rule 1.7.
1989]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or
by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and the advan-
tages and risks involved."8
The comments to Rule 1.7 distinguish the degree of adver-
sity necessary to constitute a conflict of interest. A lawyer
may not act as an advocate against a person the lawyer repre-
sents in some other matter, even if the other matter is "wholly
unrelated." 9 The comment qualifies this "adversity" standard
by stating that "simultaneous representation in unrelated mat-
ters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse, such
as competing economic enterprises, does not require consent
of the respective clients."70
The Model Rules additionally provide general guidelines for
a lawyer faced with a potential conflict. They maintain that
the critical issue is the likelihood that a conflict will actually
result.71 If a conflict does result, a lawyer must determine
whether it will "materially interfere" with his independent
professional judgment in determining the most advantageous
strategy for a client to pursue.72
The Model Rules require the lawyer to "reasonably believe"
that multiple representation will not adversely affect the cli-
ent.73 It has been argued that this test of the client's "best
interest" does little to assist the lawyer in identifying situa-
tions where disqualification is the proper course. 4
68. Id. For a discussion of disclosure and consent issues for sports lawyers to
avoid improprieties, see infra notes 210-38 and accompanying text.
69. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.7 comment (Loyalty to a Client).
70. Id.
71. See id
72. Id
73. See text accompanying supra note 68.
74. See Moore, supra note 36, at 286 (test based on client's "best interest" does
little to resolve the present "controversy and confusion over the resolution of typical
conflicts dilemmas").
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E. Conflicts for the "Sports Agent": A Fiduciary Duty
Even though sports agents are not bound to follow the vari-
ous codes of ethics governing lawyers, they are, nevertheless,
subject to conflict of interest standards generally.7 5 Agents
are held accountable and owe duties of loyalty under agency
law to their principal-clients. 76 For example, an agent must
not "place himself or voluntarily permit himself to be placed
in a position where his own interests or those of any other
person whom he has undertaken to represent may conflict
with the interests of his principal. '77
Therefore, even those agents whose representational capac-
ity encompasses exclusively "contract advising ' 7' must avoid
conflicts of interest. Any argument that the role of "agent" is
separable from that of a lawyer-such as that when a lawyer
enters sports representation, she is not bound by the ethical
constraints of the legal profession-is rendered faulty.79
75. One aspect of conflict of interest, confidentiality of information, applies to
both lawyers and agents. However, there are exceptions to confidentiality in the
sports representation industry. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Naviera Despina, Inc. v. Cooper Shipping Co., 676 F. Supp. 1134,
1141 (S.D. Ala. 1987) ("agent must not, except where the principal has full knowl-
edge and gives consent, assume any duties or enter into any transaction concerning
the subject matter of the agency in which he has an individual interest or represents
interests adverse to those of his principal"); Ramsey v. Gordon, 567 S.W.2d 868, 870
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (contract void at option of principal due to agent's personal
interest in transaction); United States v. Drisko, 303 F. Supp. 858, 860 (E.D. Va. 1969)
(agent, by secretly advancing interests of third party, "placed himself in a position of
serving conflicting interests and loyalties").
77. F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 500, at 345 (1952). See also
H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY & PARTNERSHIP
123 (1979) (duty of agent loyalty includes duty to act solely and completely for the
benefit of principal); J. WEISTART & C. LOwELL, supra note 1, § 3.19, at 329 ("There
can be little dispute that the agent has a legal duty to avoid conflicts of interest in
his representation of his athlete-clients.").
78. "Contract advisor" is the generic term often employed by various bodies that
govern persons (whether agents or lawyers) that negotiate professional sports con-
tracts. See, e.g., NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION REGULATIONS
GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS (1983) [hereinafter NFLPA REGULATIONS], a sec-
tion of which is cited infra note 237.
79. Lawyers in this area often attempt to segregate the roles of lawyer and
agent. As a practical matter, this separation is not always a complete one. A lawyer,
for example, while actively recruiting sports clients, might claim that he is not
bound by rules such as solicitation, as he is a part of the "agent business" at that
point. However, during the same recruiting process, the lawyer will no longer "hold
himself out" as only an agent if he explains the advantages of retaining a lawyer
over a non-lawyer agent. The purpose for this segregation, typically, is to avoid ap-
plication of solicitation mandates, rather than conflict of interest rules. The more
likely result under either argument is that the lawyer will be held to be practicing a
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One case delineating the sports agents' fiduciary duty to her
client is Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz.80 This case is notewor-
thy in two respects: first, it applies the agent-principal stan-
dard propounded by the Restatement of Agency; and second, it
represents one of the few modern judicial statements of con-
flict of interest (whether in regard to sports agents or sports
lawyers).
1. Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz
a. Facts
This case involved a particularly egregious conflict, since the
agent/defendant (Jerry Argovitz) was simultaneously part-
owner of a professional football team and representative of a
player signing a contract with that team.
Argovitz was negotiating former Heisman Trophy winner
Billy Sims' 1983-84 contract with the Detroit Lions of the
NFL. During these negotiations, Argovitz began to steer Sims
towards the Houston Gamblers of the rival United States
Football League, a team in which Argovitz was a 29 percent
owner.81 Despite the fact that negotiations between Argovitz
and the Lions were "progressing normally," Argovitz told
Sims that the Lions were not interested in his services and
that the Lions were not negotiating in good faith. 2 It was at
this point that Sims "negotiate[d] with a team that was par-
tially owned by his own agent. 8 3
The Gamblers' final contract offer, which totalled $3.5 mil-
lion over five years, was accepted by Sims on July 1, 1983.4
Before Sims signed the contract, Argovitz and Sims discussed
the possibility of the Lions matching the Gamblers' financial
secondary, law-related occupation and will be bound by the ethical rules governing
all lawyers. See ivkfra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
80. 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984). This case is also discussed in J. WEISTART
& C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.19 (Supp. 1985). See also Brown v. Woolf, 554 F.
Supp. 1206 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (denying sports agent's motion for summary judgment in
suit brought by former client claiming breach of fiduciary duty by virtue of agent's
alleged failure to investigate the financial stability of team, as well as certain de-
ferred compensation issues, guarantees, and agent fees).
81. Detroit Lions, 580 F. Supp at 544. Argovitz was obviously fully aware of this
breach of loyalty, as he obtained the signature of Sims on an attempted waiver of
any claim that Sims might have against Argovitz "for his blatant breach of his fiduci-
ary duty brought on by his glaring conflict of interest." Id. at 546.
82. Id. at 544-45.
83. Id, at 545.
84. Id,
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package. Sims, whose "pride was wounded" 5 since he felt
that the Lions were not interested in his services, assumed
that the Lions would not match the offer.8 Consequently, he
advised Argovitz not to initiate any more negotiations with the
Lions.
b. Issues
The court heard a great deal of evidence on Argovitz's past
"irresponsible" handling of client matters.8 7 However, only
Argovitz's conduct while negotiating Sims' contract with the
Gamblers was before the court. 8
The first issue was whether ownership of a team amounts to
an indisputable conflict for an agent or lawyer if negotiations
on behalf of a player involve that team. The more significant
issue was whether Argovitz could disclose his obvious personal
interests and obtain consent from Sims after full disclosure of
the conflict. One critical aspect of this disclosure and consent
was a determination of what level of knowledge should be
held as adequate on the part of Sims to vitiate the effects of
Argovitz's conflict.
An underlying issue in this case was whether the agent's
"self-interest" in the deal voided the transaction at the elec-
tion of the principal. Once Argovitz's personal stake in Sims'
signing with the Gamblers was established as antagonistic to
Sims, the question was whether fraud on Argovitz's part could
be "presumed,"8 9 thereby giving Sims the option to invalidate
85. Id.
86. The evidence showed that Argovitz did in fact tell Sims that he thought the
Lions would match the Gamblers' offer, and asked Sims whether he should tele-
phone the Lions. The court, though, found that Sims' decision not to have Argovitz
call the Lions was "for purely emotional reasons," i.e., being under the mistaken
belief that the Lions had lost interest in his talents. Id Sims later signed a contract
with the Lions on December 18, 1983. The Lions, along with Sims, filed a complaint
"seeking a judicial determination that the July 1, 1983, contract between Sims and
the . . . Gamblers . . . [was] invalid because [Argovitz] breached his fiduciary duty
when negotiating the Gamblers' contract and because the contract was otherwise
tainted by fraud and misrepresentation." Id at 543.
87. For example, Argovitz not only obtained Sims' waiver of a conflict of interest
(which the court labeled as "questionable conduct"), but also failed to "shop" Sims to
other employers, as most agents would have done in this situation. Additionally,
Argovitz's fee structure was unfair to his client. The court described these practices
as "troublesome" but not decisive in examining Argovitz's conduct while negotiating
the Gamblers' contract. Id. at 547.
88. Id.
89. Id at 548.
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the transaction.
c. Holding
The court, recognizing the clear fiduciary nature of this
agent-principal relationship, held that even though Sims' con-
tract with Houston may have been fair to him, it was still void-
able." The court noted that an agent's loyalty requires that an
agent not have a personal stake that conflicts with the princi-
pal-player's interest in a given transaction.91 When the agent
has a personal interest which is antagonistic to the player's in-
terest, fraud on the part of the agent is presumed.92
The court had found that Argovitz could have properly con-
tinued with the representation if: (1) he had provided Sims
with full knowledge of his interest in the transaction; (2) he
had disclosed every material fact known to him which might
affect Sims; and (3) having such knowledge, Sims had freely
consented to the transaction.93 Thus, Sims would have been
required to be aware of Argovitz's financial interest, any risks
caused by such a conflict, and the alternative courses of ac-
tions that were available at the time of the negotiations.94
The court stated that it was "dismayed" with the "careless
fashion" in which Argovitz performed his negotiation services
and found that the agent's fiduciary duty to the client had
been breached.95  The court rescinded Sims' contract with
Houston and remarked: "no man can faithfully serve two
masters whose interests are in conflict." 96
II
Conflict of Interest in Sports Representation
Sports representation is rife with abuse and unethical activ-
ity.9 7 One significant aspect of this abuse is conflict of interest,
90. Id. ("The self-interest of the agent is considered a vice which renders the
transaction voidable at the election of the principal without looking into the matter
further than to ascertain that the interest of the agent exists.").
91. Id, (citing Burleson v. Earnest, 153 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 549. For a full discussion of informed consent and disclosure, both in
this case and in general, see irqfra notes 210-48 and accompanying text.
95. Detroit Lions, 580 F. Supp. at 549.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
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both for agents and lawyers.9" Outlined below are sources of
potential and actual conflicts in sports representation, and
how these sources may run afoul of ethical concerns.99
A. Sports Clients With Competing Interests
Differing interests may arise when clients are in competi-
tion of one form or another. This is particularly true for a
sports lawyer with a broad client list. The nature of the cli-
ents involved will largely determine what type of competition
is at issue.
The area of player representation, especially in baseball, is
governed by free agency rules which allow a relatively high
degree of player-initiated movement from team to team.100
With such movement, there is an increased chance that a law-
yer with a large clientele will have clients pitted against each
other. In football, where the free agency rules are more re-
strictive,101 the chances of such a conflict decrease.
98. See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.19, at 328-31; G.
SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 8, at 147-48; R. RUXIN, supra note
14, at 61-74; Sobel, supra note 1, at 712-14.
99. The illustrations below are variously referred to as "potential" and "actual"
conflicts of interest. It has been argued that such a labelling distinction is of little
consequence, "particularly in view of the confusion engendered by attempts to give
meaning to these terms." Moore, supra note 36, at 222 n.46. While the most difficult
area in determining the propriety of multiple representation is said to be the disclo-
sure and obtaining of client consent, see infra notes 211-38 and accompanying text, a
second major source of confusion is the initial determination that a conflict of inter-
est actually exists. Moore, supra note 36, at 216-20. While those situations character-
ized in this Article as creating an "actual" conflict may be more apt to require
lawyer disqualification, the significance of the potential-actual distinction is of far
less importance than the paramount issue of initially recognizing the existence of
any conflict at all. Such a recognition occurs under the ABA Code when the exer-
cise of the lawyer's "independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be
or is likely to be adversely affected... or it would be likely to involve him in repre-
senting differing iiterests." See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. Under
the Model Rules, a conflict exists whenever "the representation of [a] client may be
materially limited by the lawyer's other responsibilities to another client." See
supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
100. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 5.03, at 516-24 and §§ 88-90
(Supp. 1985). The 1981 collective bargaining agreement between the team owners
and the Major League Baseball Players Association substantially changed the com-
pensation that teams are due upon the loss of a free agent player. As for player
mobility, the agreement remained largely identical to the 1976 agreement, which had
allowed players with six years in the major leagues to become free agents by notify-
ing their club (following the season) of an intention to become a free agent. See id.
at 501-03.
101. See Singman, Free Agency and the National Football League, 8 LOy. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 259, 259 (1988) (explaining why football players are not presently "free
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The following is a list of possible competing interests which
an agent or sports lawyer might encounter. The particular
conflicts highlighted do not represent an exclusive list; they
merely serve to illustrate the myriad of potential sports clients
in competition with one another.
1. Players on the Same Team
A potential conflict may arise when a lawyer's client list in-
cludes several different athletes in the same sport. If the
rights to both players are held by the same team, the lawyer
may sacrifice or compromise one player's demands in order to
negotiate a more favorable contract for the other. Negotiating
such a "package deal" may force the lawyer to independently
(and perhaps arbitrarily) rank the relative worth of both ath-
letes. °2 Even under the most liberal reading of the rules of
ethics, a lawyer in this position would be hard-pressed to pro-
agents" with freedom of choice in the selection of an employer and suggesting "how
the current stalemate over free agency could be solved"); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
supra note 1, § 5.03, at 508-14.
Following the expiration of the latest collective bargaining agreement on August
31, 1987, and the resulting players strike, the NFLPA sought relief in the courts. See
Powell v. National Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777, 788 (D. Minn. 1988) (suit alleg-
ing that player movement restraints violated antitrust attack until the parties
reached a bargaining impasse over that issue); Powell v. National Football League,
No. 4-87-917 (D. Minn. filed July 12, 1988) (Motion by players to declare unrestricted
free agency pending resolution on the merits was denied. Despite finding that the
players would likely be successful on the merits, and the probability of many players
suffering irreparable injury, the court, in part, based its holding on the potential
migration of key players to more attractive clubs which "could have a devastating,
long-term impact on the competitive balance within the league.").
On February 1, 1988, the NFL owners unilaterally initiated a free agency plan that
could escalate player movement in that league, thereby increasing the chances for a
lawyer's potential conflict of interest due to competing player interests. Under the
so-called "Plan B," each NFL team "protected" 37 players on its roster; all remain-
ing players (619 in the league) were free to move to a new team for a two-month
period, without compensation due their former club. Forbes, Controversial New
Plan Goes Into Fffect Today, USA Today, Feb. 1, 1989, at C3, col. 2 (including rules
governing the free agency system, as supplied by the Management Council and
NFLPA); see Mihoces, NFL Free Agents: Big Names, Big Money, USA Today, Feb. 3,
1989, at C1, col. 2; id. at C6, col. 3 (including team-by-team listing of protected and
unprotected players).
102. See, e.g., Neff, supra note 1, at 84. The Kansas City Royals' Hal McRae and
Frank White were represented in 1981 contract negotiations by Tony Pace, who was
apparently not a lawyer. The representative was reported to have refused to come
to terms on White's contract until the Royals agreed to extend McRae's, which had
two years to run. Id Royals management claimed that White, who had only one
year left on his contract, could have signed a new contract a month earlier if Pace
had tried to negotiate. R. RUXIN, supra note 14, at 68.
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vide each athlete with her undivided loyalty. 10 3
A similar conflict could arise if a lawyer represents multiple
clients who seek remuneration from a limited fund. For ex-
ample, a lawyer might represent two NBA players on the
same team, where the aggregate salaries of each team in that
league must not surpass a "salary cap."'
2. Players at the Same Position
Competing player interests becomes a more acute problem if
both athletes play the same position. Sports lawyers must
often assist in "agent"-type services, procuring the most at-
tractive employment opportunities for an athlete. A lawyer
may be tempted to seek out certain teams that do not have
any conflicting clients, potentially bypassing the most attrac-
tive employer. 05 Moreover, the lawyer fails to comply with
the vigorous representation mandates of the ethics rules by
not fully pursuing opportunities for a client."°
3. Players on the Same Team and Same Position
A lawyer's clients may both play the same position on the
same team. For example, a sports lawyer might represent sev-
eral quarterbacks vying for a single roster position. With one
available employment opportunity and two clients, the lawyer
may be subject to a conflict. 0 7 The conflict is evident when
the lawyer is in a position to bolster one athlete's playing sta-
103. But see R. RUXIN, supra note 14, at 69 ("multiple representation on the same
team can benefit the players," as the agent or attorney-due to her representing
both players--can negotiate for more money in total for the players).
104. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 8, at 135. The
1987 salary cap for the NBA was $6.7 million for each team of 12 players; that cap
was increased for the 1988 season to $7.232 million. Hannon, Profile: Stan Kasten,
SPORTS INC., Oct. 3, 1988, at 22. The regulations governing player agents, however,
specifically state that representation of two players will not per se create a conflict
of interest. See NBPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS § 3(B)(g) (1986)
[hereinafter NBPA REGULATIONS] (general rule is to avoid conflict of interest when
representing NBA players, "provided that the representation of two or more players
on any one club shall not itself be deemed to be prohibited").
105. See, e.g., Neff, supra note 1, at 84 (lawyer Leigh Steinberg facing a conflict
when quarterback Warren Moon was seeking employment with the New York Gi-
ants, a team with another quarterback-client on the roster, Scott Brunner).
106. For example, the lawyer's "independent professional judgment" may be im-
paired in this situation. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
107. But see R. RUXIN, supra note 14, at 70 (quoting a United States congressional
investigation discussion, where an agent's representation of five pitchers on the same
baseball team was argued not to present a conflict; the multiple player-clients bene-
fit the club through competition, which the agent cannot control).
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tus with management. Such a scenario obviously would re-
quire full disclosure to all interested clients. 08
4. Coaches in the Same League
Coaches also present possibilities for conflicts of interest. A
lawyer may represent a group of coaches (whether assistant or
head coaches), who are all seeking the same position.'09
5. Coaches on the Same Team
The head coach and assistant coaches on the same staff may
also present the lawyer with a potential conflict. As with the
other competing client interests mentioned, a lawyer could
possibly favor one client over the other, thus violating the du-
ties of "zealous" representation." 0
B. Endorsements
The sports lawyer, depending on the marketability of his cli-
ent, may be in a position to increase his client's income by se-
curing and negotiating endorsement contracts. Such an
opportunity could present a lawyer with a potential conflict of
interest.
The lawyer's duty of confidentiality may be jeopardized
when a lawyer negotiates an endorsement contract and repre-
sents two or more players in the same sport."' Players in the
same sport are likely to inquire what other similarly situated
players receive from this off-the-field source of income. Dis-
108. See infra notes 210-38 and accompanying text.
109. This potential conflict is discussed in terms of the lawyer narrowing his
scope of representation and obtaining client consent to such a representation. See
infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. A related area of concern is the
sports lawyer with so many clients that she may not have enough time to adequately
represent all interests. See R. RUXIN, supra note 14, at 71 (Because "few agent[s] are
likely to admit to a lack of time, the player must make his own assessment and
weigh it as one factor in his choice of agents."). For lawyers, this area is more accu-
rately an issue of competence and the duty to avoid "neglect." See MODEL RULES,
supra note 35, Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer provid[ing . . . competent representation to a
client... requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reason-
ably necessary for the representation."); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 186-88. See,
e.g., Cortlett v. Gordon, 106 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 165 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1980) (court recog-
nizing the settled rule that lawyers, whether in large law firms or solo practitioners,
are obligated not to undertake legal representation without adequate time).
111. Confidentiality (both for sports agents and lawyers) is discussed elsewhere in
this Article as an important policy underpinning conflict of interest generally. See
supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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closing this information to an inquiring player may breach the
duty owed to the player with the endorsement contract. Such
a breach of confidence could arise, for example, when the law-
yer shares the terms of one baseball player's glove or shoe
contract with another player.112 Conversely, by not conveying
such information to another client, the lawyer may be with-
holding marketing information which the client expects to
hear from his representative.1
If the lawyer's compensation is a percentage of the client's
endorsement income," 4 there may be a conflict, because the
lawyer has a personal interest in the endorsement contract's
outcome." 5 An endorsement contract or commercial may not
be advisable based on several factors. For example, not only
could the product or service endorsed be simply inappropriate
considering the image the particular athlete is attempting to
put forth, but also too many endorsement arrangements at a
certain time in an athlete's career may weaken his or her fu-
ture marketability. The lawyer, nevertheless, may advise the
client to accept the endorsement so that the lawyer can collect
his percentage fee.
Another conceivable endorsement conflict would involve a
lawyer faced with one advertising or endorsement offer for
two clients. A company with an advertising budget allowing
for endorsements by one athlete might approach a lawyer
with multiple clients, all of whom would be interested in such
an endorsement. This situation would be rare, however, due
largely to the regional appeal of sports personalities that en-
dorse products. 6 Nevertheless, the question of whether each
112. See Neff, supra note 1, at 85 (raising questions about lawyer Tom Reich's
endorsement negotiations for baseball clients Dave Parker and Tim Raines).
113. In this particular situation, as a practical matter, the glove or shoe contract
market, in general, would not be the subject of confidentiality principles. An indi-
vidual endorsement, though, would be protected information. Confidentiality, an im-
portant policy consideration for conflicts of interest, generally takes on a different
meaning in the area of sports law. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
114. The more typical arrangements, including those from the major sports man-
agement firms, give the representative or firm 25% of all income, both on and off the
playing field. See, e.g., irLfra notes 170-79 (tennis star Ivan Lendl only obligated to
pay a commission of 7.5% while other clients bound to higher rates).
115. This type of personal financial interest could clearly be argued to compro-
mise the lawyer's loyalty to his client. Such a financial stake may influence the
lawyer's "independent professional judgment." See, e.g., ABA CODE, supra note 35,
DR 5-103, 5-104 (requiring lawyers to avoid an acquisition of a personal interest in
the client's matters, as well as limiting business relations with clients).
116. Note, though, that many top athletes and sports personalities command na-
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client should retain independent counsel is pertinent.'17
The service of procuring and negotiating endorsement con-
tracts may be provided by an athlete's lawyer. An athlete may
retain a sports lawyer to negotiate his playing contract, while
specifically retaining a sports management firm"18 for endorse-
ment services.11 9 Sports lawyers may attempt to segregate the
negotiation of endorsement contracts from "practicing law.' 20
However, the lawyer would still be engaged in a separate, law-
related occupation 12 under the ABA Code. 122 Thus, the law-
tional endorsements. See, e.g., Comte, Jordan to Sign $19-Mil Nike Dea4 SPORTS
INC., July 25, 1988, at 1 (discussing NBA star Michael Jordan's seven-year, $19 mil-
lion shoe contract with Nike, potentially the biggest ever from a shoe company).
The more "everyday" athletes and personalities, though, typically settle for more
regional agreements. See, e.g., Comte, Endorsements. Coaches For Sale, SPORTS INC.,
Apr. 18, 1988, at 40 (Select college coaches have great earning potential, which is at
its peak when the combined factors of television exposure, personality, and on-the-
court winnings are present.).
117. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.19, at 328 (posing hypotheti-
cal of a manufacturer seeking endorsements from athletes all represented by the
same individual, thus leaving the lawyer "in a position of having to choose between
several equally well-suited candidates"). Representing multiple sports clients, con-
versely, may be advantageous to the players. It is possible that, once a lawyer turns
down a company's endorsement offer for a particular athlete, the lawyer could steer
the company to other clients that she represents.
118. These sports management firms, such as International Management Group,
are discussed elsewhere in this Article in terms of another conflict: event manage-
ment. See infra notes 150-79 and accompanying text.
119. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.19, at 331 (agent may be
appointed for limited purpose of handling an athlete's investments, or securing en-
dorsement and appearance contracts). See, e.g., News By Sport: Will Tim Brown Get
Endorsement Offers?, SPORTS INC., Sept. 19, 1988, at 10 (discussing 1987 Heisman
Trophy winner Tim Brown's hiring of a lawyer for contract negotiations, and an
endorsement firm for marketing and endorsements). Also, the law firm may have
an adjoining endorsement company which may be owned or operated by lawyers.
See also Note, Crossing the Line: Issues Facing Entertainment Attorneys Engaged in
Related Secondary Occupations, 8 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 481, 492-93 (1985) (dis-
cussing the common involvement of attorneys in representation areas where legal
advice is not needed, such as a talent agent or personal manager).
120. Lawyers often attempt to segregate the roles of lawyer and agent. See supra
note 79.
121. An occupation unrelated to law is one in which the products or services pro-
vided by the attorney to customers or clients do not involve services which would be
essentially legal in nature. Note, supra note 119, at 503 (citing New York State Bar
Association Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 206
(1971), reprinted in 44 N.Y. ST. B.J. 120 (1972)). Examples of law-related occupa-
tions include a lawyer acting as an income tax specialist, loan broker, or insurance
agent; occupations unrelated to the law would include a lawyer operating a shopping
center, retail store, or manufacturing enterprise. "Id.
122. The ABA CODE has traditionally been wary of lawyers engaging in dual oc-
cupations. One concern is that a lawyer may employ the other occupation as a
"feeder" for his law practice, in violation of the rules against solicitation. C. WOLF-
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yer would continue to be bound by conflict of interest man-
dates, as in any practice area.123 Of course, sports agents and
others acting on behalf of the athlete, as fiduciaries under
agency law, would still be held to conflict of interest
standards.124
C. Inherent Conflict With Fee Arrangements
Unethical actions in connection with fee arrangements are
rampant in sports representation. 25 One portion of the law-
yer's duty to charge reasonable fees 126 relates to conflict of in-
terest. A lawyer might conduct negotiations in such a way
that concern for his own fee is placed above the interests of
his client-clearly falling out of the vigorous representation
category. Two distinct scenarios often arise. In both situa-
tions, the lawyer could be subject to a charge of conflict of
interest.
1. Premature Contractual Agreement
The first conflict of interest in connection with fee arrange-
RAM, supra note 36, at 897. Other reservations of the Bar include lawyer compe-
tence, and the chance that the lawyer will be recognized as a specialist, contrary to
the Bar's reluctance to permit specialization. Id A dual practice will be allowed
under the ABA CODE, as long as the specifications governing professional notices are
satisfied. See ABA CODE, supra note 35, DR 2-102 (requiring public notices generally
to be in a "dignified form").
123. ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 328
(1972). The opinion provides:
[A] lawyer may conduct, in compliance with DR 2-102(E), his law practice
and a second occupation, not law-related, from one office; and he may prac-
tice from the same office both as a lawyer and as a member of a law-related
profession or occupation, such as a marriage counselor, accountant, labor
relations consultant, real estate broker, or mortgage broker, if he complies
... with all provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility while con-
ducting his second, law-related occupation. .
Id (emphasis added). See also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 897 ("A lawyer contin-
ues to remain subject to the lawyer codes, even if the lawyer holds another certifi-
cate and even if the lawyer's work with clients involves fields and professions other
than law.").
124. See supra notes 75-96 and accompanying text.
125. It was reported that one sports agent charged an amount equal to one full
contract year of a three-year contract. R. RUXIN, supra note 14, at 4. See generally
J. WEISTART & C. LowELL, supra note 1, § 3.18.
126. See MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.5(a) (lawyers bound to charge fees
that are "reasonable"); ABA CODE, supra note 35, DR 2-106(B) ("Clearly excessive"
test will disallow a particular fee when, "after a review of the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in
excess of a reasonable fee.").
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ments relates to the overall negotiation practices of the law-
yer. A lawyer may come to terms with a team earlier than is
warranted or than that player's market value would require.
The primary motivation for such a premature contractual
agreement is directly related to the method the lawyer utilizes
to charge her clients.127 If the lawyer's billing is based on a
percentage of the player's contract, 128 she is paid when the
athlete is paid. The earlier the negotiations are concluded, the
sooner the lawyer can collect her fee.
If the lawyer is in fact motivated-to the extent that it af-
fects the ongoing negotiations of her client-to come to an
early settlement with the club based on the time that she will
collect her fee, then undoubtedly a conflict of interest would
exist. 129 The player, as a consequence of this scenario, is left
with non-vigorous representation at a point when the lawyer's
role is most crucial. 130 Fortunately, instances such as these are
not widespread. 13
It could also be argued that even a sports lawyer with an
hourly rate fee has a conflict, such as a desire to extend nego-
127. The classic argument in the sports law area pits two generally accepted
methods for determining fees against each other: hourly, or through a percentage of
the total contract's value. See Fraley & Harwell, Ethics and the Sports Lawyer: The
Duty to Charge Fees That are "Reasonable'" The Media and the Rule of Self-Promo-
tion, 6 THE SPORTS LAW. 3 (Fall 1988) (including the arguments on both sides and
stating that the "debate ... is really of little significance in the area of ethics and the
sports lawyer," as lawyers are bound to charge fees that are "reasonable").
128. Although the risks of the percentage method include the unethical conduct
of collecting up-front payments, it has been argued that the hourly rate method mili-
tates against developing a personal relationship with clients. See Neff, supra note 1,
at 83 (quoting sports lawyer Leigh Steinberg).
129. For a discussion under the ABA CODE on conflicts of interest when lawyers'
personal interests conflict with those of clients, see supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
130. The role of the negotiator in the sports representation industry is a crucial
position. This remains the case, despite the fact that many player salaries (particu-
larly those in the NFL and NBA) are "slotted" by teams and representatives based
on the athlete's draft position. The skills of the agent or lawyer can make an aston-
ishing difference financially for a particular player.
131. These instances, although not prevalent, are so vivid that the time of the
year a player signs is often determined (and easily predicted) by who represents him.
Specific examples of this in sports representation usually involve sports agents,
although more and more lawyers are serving in those roles. See supra notes 27-29
and accompanying text. These agents' livelihood depends on continued representa-
tion of professional prospects. Many unscrupulous agents have engaged in intense
recruitment of athletes, many times in violation of NCAA rules. See supra notes 17-
20 and accompanying text.
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tiations with the club, thereby increasing the applicable fee.13 2
2. "Face Value" vs. Present Value
The second scenario for fee arrangement conflicts also re-
lates to lawyers who bill on a percentage basis. A player's con-
tract has two values: the "face value" and the present value. 133
The face value is often that figure disseminated to the general
public, and includes any deferred payment provisions. The
present or actual worth of the contract will be a smaller
number.1 3 4 Despite the real value of the negotiated contract,
some lawyers may figure their percentage according to the
face value-the inflated figure-of the contract.1 35 In effect,
the lawyer is misrepresenting the percentage he charges
because his bill is calculated according to a misleading
number. 3 6
132. The primary emphasis in this discussion is that the sports representation in-
dustry involves working with highly compensated individuals, see supra note 10, in
an extremely competitive setting. This combination arguably requires caution in the
area of ethics generally, and conflict of interest in particular, regardless of the fee
arrangements chosen.
133. A team benefits greatly by deferring players' salaries. Conversely, players
and their representatives typically seek contracts with greater "up-front" value, such
as signing bonuses. In terms of sports representation, salary comparisons among
agents and lawyers clearly distinguish contracts with this greater present value and
the face value. See, e.g., Fichtenbaum, Rookie Salaries Soar 20%-Plus, SPORTS INC.,
Oct. 24, 1988, at 1 (1988 NBA salary survey includes separate listing of amounts of
average deferred compensation in individual contracts along with average and me-
dian player salaries).
134. To illustrate, suppose that an agent or lawyer negotiates a five-year player
contract for $5 million. Assuming, for hypothetical purposes, that the player is paid
at the end of each year, the present value (at a discount rate of 10%) is $3.7 million.
See D. KIESO & J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 236 (4th ed. 1983) (defin-
ing present value as the "amount that must be invested now to produce the known
future value"; present value is "always a smaller amount than the known future
amount because interest will be earned and accumulated on the present value to the
future date"). In most player contracts, the only actual immediate payment is the
player's signing bonus, if any. All yearly salaries, unless otherwise provided, are
paid weekly during that portion of the year consisting of the actual season.
135. This issue of the value of the negotiated salary must be compared to the first
conflict of interest possibility of this section: sacrificing a client's interest by signing
the client early to collect a fee. The former of the two issues would arguably fit not
as a conflict of interest issue, but as an issue of "reasonable" fees and the ethical
provisions thereunder. See supra note 126.
136. To combat this scenario, league players associations have specifically allowed
a lawyer or agent to collect a fee only as the athlete is paid. See, e.g., NBPA REGU-
LATIONS, supra note 104, § 4(B) ("It is the intent of these Regulations that the player
agent shall not be entitled to receive any fee for his services until the player receives
the compensation upon which the fee is based. Consistent with this objective, a
player agent is prohibited from including any provision in a fee agreement with a
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Another problem area involves the basic structure of a
player's salary. For various reasons, 1 7 an athlete may be best
served by income deferral, rather than accelerated compensa-
tion, such as a signing bonus. A lawyer may disregard these
needs and structure the athlete's salary so that compensation
is greater in the initial years of the contract, once again, with
sights set on his own interests, rather than the client's.3'3  The
lawyer's personal interest in collecting his percentage as soon
as possible creates a possible conflict of interest. 3 9
D. Advising the Amateur Athlete
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 4 ° rules
forbid any student-athlete with remaining eligibility from en-
tering into an agreement (whether orally or in writing) with
an agent to negotiate a professional sports contract.141 These
amateur rules do not, however, prevent a student-athlete from
"securing advice from a lawyer concerning a proposed profes-
player whereby the player becomes obligated to make any fee payment to the agent
in advance of the player's receipt of the compensation upon which the fee is based.").
137. Such reasons might include the athlete's immediate financial needs, or (con-
sidering the athlete's strengths, weaknesses, and team's personnel needs) the
player's suitability for a particular team. See generally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
supra note 1, § 3.17, at 321.
138. See, e.g., Burrow v. Probus Management, Inc., No. 16-840, at 6 (N.D. Ga.,
Aug. 9, 1973) (unpublished order) (cited in J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1,
§ 3.17, at 321) (agent who advised athlete to accept an up-front bonus not acting in
client's best interest, as it was "for the purpose of acquiring immediate funds for the
benefit of the [agent]"). J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.17, at 321 (A
recurring criticism is that agents too frequently negotiate for terms which will in-
sure that they are paid immediately," thus disregarding the athlete's needs.).
139. See generally E. GARVEY, THE AGENT GAME 31, 37 (1984); G. SCHUBERT, R.
SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, supra note 8, at 136; Sobel, supra note 1, at 712.
140. The NCAA is a voluntary association whose approximately 900 members, by
joining the organization, agree to abide by certain terms and conditions of member-
ship. Membership institutions include almost all of the major four-year colleges and
universities in America. Membership obligates the individual athletic departments
to operate consistently with NCAA legislation. Wong & Ensor, The NCAA's Enforce-
ment Procedure-Erosion of Confidentiality, 4 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 13 (1985).
141. NCAA CONST. art. III, § 1(c), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL 10. The provision
provides in part:
Any individual who contracts or who has ever contracted orally or in writ-
ing to be represented by an agent in the marketing of the individual's ath-
letic ability or reputation in a sport no longer shall be eligible for
intercollegiate athletics in that sport. An agency contract not specifically
limited in writing to a particular sport or particular sports shall be deemed
applicable to all sports.
Id. (citations omitted).
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sional contract."142 Therefore, a lawyer is free to discuss an
eligible student-athlete's professional career, generally, "un-
less the lawyer also represents the student-athlete in negotia-
tions for such a contract. '143
A lawyer could encounter a potential conflict of interest
when advising such a student-athlete, particularly if the law-
yer expected to represent him once he embarked on his pro-
fessional career. Obviously, if the client is advised to turn
professional, the lawyer gains a new client.1 "
The sports lawyer must always be aware of his own motives
when advising a student-athlete. He is obligated to make a
due diligence search among coaches, scouts, and experts in the
sport concerning the player's draft status, both in that particu-
lar year and in other possible years. Market research for the
particular sport is equally crucial to help determine the
player's immediate and future salary potential. Other consid-
erations include the player's maturity, as a person and as an
athlete, and the ever-present possibility of an injury. If it is in
the best interests of the player to remain an amateur for an-
other season, the lawyer must be prepared to advise him of
that.
E. Players Association Lawyers
It has been asserted that lawyers who are employed by a
players association1 45 face an actual conflict of interest when
they also represent member-players of the association. 46 For
142. Id.
143. Id,
144. See MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 7.3 comment ("Furthermore, the law-
yer seeking the retainer is faced with conflict stemming from the lawyer's own in-
terest, which may color the advice and representation offered the vulnerable
prospect.") (emphasis added).
145. For a discussion of collective bargaining in sports and the advent of players
associations' viable collective bargaining unions, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
supra note 1, § 6.01, at 778.
146. See Sobel, supra note 1, at 713-14; G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE,
supra note 8, at 135. See also Neff, supra note 1, at 83-85. Attorney Larry Fleisher
has concurrently served as General Counsel to the National Basketball Players As-
sociation and lawyer for players in that league; lawyer Gary Holthus lists the Pro
Bowlers Tour and several individual bowlers as clients. Fleisher, along with Alan
Eagelson, who represents hockey players and is employed by the National Hockey
League Players Association, "may be privy to information not available to other [at-
torneys] . . .[a]nd there surely are times when [they] must act officially in a way
that's at odds with the specific interests of one or more of their individual clients.
Are Eagelson and Fleisher [attorneys] or union bosses first?" Id. at 83-84.
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example, the interests of the National Football League Play-
ers Association, as a whole, may differ from those of an indi-
vidual player.
Common issues at the negotiating table include player mo-
bility, compensation, disciplinary measures for players who vi-
olate league rules, and other general "terms or conditions of
employment. '147 The wide range of salaries in the various
leagues1 48 and the inherent instability of employment in sports
cause individual parties to have widespread interests. Such va-
rying interests may result in a single player-such as a super-
star-finding his lawyer, who also represents the players
association, at collective bargaining meetings arguing for posi-
tions adverse to his. In fact, an individual's employment bene-
fits might have to be sacrificed to reach an agreement with
management. This type of agreement may have the effect of
aiding lower-level employees at the expense of the superstar
athlete-client. The lawyer's conflict of interest here is clear
and disqualification should be considered. 49
F. Event Management
Some lawyers or agents may be in a position not only to rep-
resent many athletes, but also to control the athletic events in
which clients participate, a scenario that leaves such persons
"actually running those sports."'150 The example cited most
often involves the world's largest sports management firm, In-
ternational Management Group (IMG).151 Firms of this type 52
147. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, sup'ra note 1, § 6.08, at 813 (discussing the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act's definition of the term "collective bargaining," including
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment").
148. In the NBA, while the minimum league salary is $100,000 (the highest
among the major three professional team sports), salaries of players are well over $2
million a year, with Patrick Ewing, Kareem Abdul-Jabaar, and Magic Johnson mak-
ing over $3 million annually. See Fichtenbaum, Surprise! Stars' Salaries Are Up,
SPORTS INC., Nov. 7, 1980, at 3.
149. See, e.g., INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, supra note 14, at 7 (reporting
on a NLRB ruling that, based on conflict of interest grounds, two agents represent-
ing players in the Major Indoor Soccer League could not be officials of the MISL
Players Association).
150. Neff, supra note 1, at 83.
151. See generally Cooney, The Real Army Behind Arnie and Greg, GOLF DIGEST,
Oct. 1987, at 66-76. The firm has 21 offices in 14 countries, and some 500 employees
worldwide. The IMG client list includes 350 athletes in many sports, most notably in
golf and tennis. Id. at 68, 72.
152. Many firms similar to IMG have been organized in the past ten years. This
discussion is not directed solely to them. See Cook, Sports Marketing, BUSINESS
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offer a wide variety of services to the sports industry: legal
representation of individual athletes, procurement and negoti-
ation of endorsement and promotional opportunities, and man-
aging and packaging events in which the athletes compete.1
53
Some firms even televise the event through a subsidiary.
154
This grip on the sports industry is so strong that opponents of
IMG allege that an actual conflict of interest exists between
IMG and its clients.
Proponents of these management companies claim that
event managers cannot guarantee a first-class sports tourna-
ment if they do not have first-class players under their con-
trol.155 These firms formulate the idea for the event, organize
it, and go to great lengths and expense to ensure its success.
Proponents argue that because the firms have taken large
risks in creating these events,5 6 it would not be "moral,
proper, or legal" to deny them the right to control the
events.157 While these significant business risks have admit-
tedly translated into substantial income for the firms, it has
been argued that such risks have also advanced and improved
the various sports.158 Those currently opposing simultaneous
player representation and event management-the very ones
assisted by these risks-may have forgotten the gains made by
IMG. 159
WEEK, Aug. 31, 1987, at 48, 52 (noting that the "Big Three" sports firms, IMG,
ProServ, and Advantage International, dominate the market, but "there are more
than 500 such companies in the U.S. today, up from fewer than a dozen five years
ago").
153. Firms such as IMG and ProServ are most commonly known for the manage-
ment of golf and tennis events. See, e.g., Cooney, supra note 151, at 71 (explaining
how IMG organized the World Match Play Championships and the European Tour-
nament Players Championships, both golf tournaments in England).
154. An IMG subsidiary, Trans World International, is the world's largest in-
dependent source and distributor of televised sports programming. It produces and
develops many sporting events, such as Wimbledon, NFL Football, and the U.S.
Open. Id. at 73.
155. Cook, Mark McCormack Does Everything but Play the Game, BUSINESS
WEEK, Aug. 31, 1987, at 52.
156. One stated risk taken by such event managers is the availability of television
advertising for the event. Id.
157. Id. (quoting attorney Mark McCormack, founder of IMG).
158. Comte, Trouble is, No One is in Charge: Mega-Agents Control Tourneys, But
the Sport is Facing a Volley of Power Plays, SPORTS INC., Aug. 29, 1988, at 16, 17
(quoting Ray Benton, former president and CEO of ProServ, as stating that "[a] very
large part of the growth of tennis can be attributed to the business risks taken by
ProServ and IMG").
159. Id at 17 (claiming that entities, formerly assisted by the risks taken by event
managers, now state: "We don't need you anymore.").
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1. The Sports Management Scenario
The power of sports management firms is best illustrated by
an example. A firm such as IMG may create an entirely new
golf tournament. After procuring corporate sponsorship, the
firm might steer its players to the event,6 ° which results in
the firm representing both "payers and payees.'' 116 These
firms may also get paid for conducting special events during
the tournament. The final "frightening" move occurs when
the firm holds back several clients from another tournament
to undermine the rival.1 6
2
This influence can even be taken a step further. Represen-
tation of individual athletes in sports such as golf and tennis is
obviously a centerpiece for the success of these firms. Up-and-
coming athletes often train at specialized camps devoted ex-
clusively to professional development. 63 Some sports manage-
ment firms have extended their sphere of influence by
acquiring several of these camps and then giving them "a pipe-
line into the future, in the inside track of signing some of the
brightest stars of the future. 164
2. Formal Charges Filed
The immense authority of these management firms has not
gone unnoticed. One sports committee urged the British gov-
ernment to investigate IMG for possible conflicts of interest,
165
160. It is commonplace for golf and tennis players to receive appearance fees for
specialized tournaments and non-PGA or Grand Slam events. Such fees are guaran-
teed regardless of a player's final finish in the event. See Neff, supra note 1, at 83
(claiming that appearance money may eliminate an important incentive to win, re-
ducing some tournaments to mere exhibitions); see also irfra notes 172-75 and ac-
companying text (describing the process known as "packaging," where a
management company, in an attempt to generate more profits, lowers one player's
fees in order to include other players also represented by the firm).
161. Neff, supra note 1, at 83. These management firms may receive upwards of
25% of an athlete's gross revenues, including any off-the-field income (such as from
promotions and endorsements). Cooney, supra note 151, at 68.
162. See, e.g., Cooney, supra note 151, at 71. This article explains how IMG cre-
ated the Piccadilly World Match Play Championships and then "flexed its muscle[s]"
to hold back Jack Nicklaus, Arnold Palmer and Gary Player from the Alcan Golfer
of the Year Tournament in England. Id.
163. See Comte, Pressing the Junior Court: Tomorrow's Tennis Stars are Signing
Contracts Today, SPORTS INC., Sept. 5, 1988, at 42 (discussing intense competition for
up-and-coming tennis stars by sports management companies; such recruiting begins
when the athletes are as young as 12 years old).
164. Comte, supra note 158, at 17 (noting IMG's recent acquisition of the prestigi-
ous Nick Bollettieri tennis camps in Florida).
165. Cooney, supra note 151, at 70. See also Cook, supra note 155, at 52 (noting
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because IMG concurrently conducted tournaments, repre-
sented players, and negotiated foreign television rights for sev-
eral tournaments. 166 The Men's International Professional
Tennis Council (MTC)167 brought suit in federal court against
IMG and ProServ for conflict of interest and restraint of
trade,168 seeking to outlaw those firms, and all firms that rep-
resent individuals, from also running tournaments.169
Tennis star Ivan Lendl also sued a sports management com-
pany, his former representative, ProServ.1 7 0 The original com-
that a British government commission inquiry remarked that "the situation is preg-
nant with conflict of interest").
166. Cook, supra note 155, at 52.
167. The MTC, the governing body of men's professional tennis in the United
States, is made up of three factions: (1) the Association of Tennis Professionals
(ATP); (2) the various tournament directors; and (3) the International Tennis Feder-
ation. Comte, Men's Council May Disband: Last-Ditch Proposal Doesn't Stop ATP
Tour, SPORTS INC., Oct. 31, 1988, at 3. The ATP, failing to agree on such issues as the
control of the Grand Prix Circuit and increased prize money for players, has at-
tempted to launch its own tour, which may alter the current structure of the MTC.
See id.
168. See Cook, supra note 155, at 52 (noting the federal court case based on con-
flict of interest and restraint of trade and quoting Michael Davies of the MTC that
"It]heir conflicts and entanglements now threaten our sport to the extent that we
feel the agents must now choose whether they will represent players or tournaments
.... They can't do both").
169. Comte, supra note 158, at 17 (quoting MTC administrator Marshall Happer:
"[t]ournaments feel intimidated by these agents because they hold so much power
.... We've outlawed them from running tournaments in 1989 and they're screaming
bloody murder"). This article summarizes the "monopolistic" controls of the firms:
"[t]hey dominate most of the 79 Grand Prix events, managing the tournaments, mar-
keting them, selling TV rights, providing the players, shopping for sponsors and even
handing the trophies to the winners on site .... [They] tak[e] a percentage of the
action, from the appearance fees they have their tournaments pay their players to
ticket sales." Id.
It appears that this suit by the MTC, as well as the Ivan Lendl suit, see irfra note
170, will not force these management firms to make an election between managing
events or representing individual athletes, as the case was settled out of court. See
Smith, MTC Lists 1990 Tour, Union Will Counter, USA Today, Dec. 2, 1988, at C3,
col. 1. Interestingly, though, the management firm Advantage International,
founded in 1983 by former ProServ partners, has made a determination that it will
only "represent players ... [and not] control the forum they're going to play in."
Cook, supra note 155, at 53.
170. See Lendl and Taconic Enterprises, Inc. v. ProServ, Inc., Donald L. Dell,
Jerry Solomon and Alonzo Monk, No. B-88-254 (D. Conn. filed May 5, 1988) [herein-
after Lendl Complaint]. This Lendl action was a counter-suit to ProServ's original
$7 million action, brought in Washington D.C. See ProServ, Inc. v. Taconic Enter-
prises, Inc. and Ivan Lendl, No. 88-0353 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 11, 1988). ProServ initi-
ated its action when Lendl, under contract with ProServ, split with the company to
form his own management firm. See Muiz, Lendl's Counterpunch, SPORTS INC., May
9, 1988, at 3.
The suit was settled out of court. See Update: Tennis, USA Today, Nov. 29, 1988,
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plaint, seeking more than $15 million in damages, alleged that
ProServ had a conflict of interest and had breached its fiduci-
ary duty owed to Lendl."'
The focus of Lendl's suit was his claim that ProServ actively
engaged in "packaging" his talents with other clients.172 Ac-
cording to Lendl's complaint, packaging occurs when a man-
agement company commits a client to merchandising
arrangements, appearances, and exhibitions, at less than
favorable terms, as a means of diverting income to their other
tennis player clients. The complaint alleged that this in-
creased ProServ's commission income, 173 due to ProServ's gen-
eral billing methods; the majority of clients of the
management company were obligated to pay markedly higher
rates than Lendl.174 This practice seemingly violates the du-
ties of undivided loyalty and vigorous representation, which
must be adhered to when representing multiple clients.175
Lendl also alleged that event management coupled with
player representation amounts to a conflict of interest. The
lawyers representing Lendl stated:
ProServ frequently acted in a dual role as the operator or paid
representative of an exhibition or event in which defendants
also negotiated with the event's sponsor to supply the services
of Lendl. The sponsor's role in a men's tennis event is largely
confined to purchasing the right to promote the sponsor's
name in connection with the event. The "operator" of a
at Cll, col. 1. Under the terms of the settlement, Lendl was not obligated to make
any money payments; however, he agreed to continue paying ProServ a 7.5% com-
mission, see infra note 174, on all endorsement arrangements he signed while his
was represented by ProServ. Briefs, SPORTS INC., Dec. 5, 1988, at 51.
171. Other claims included fraud, breach of contract, diversion of funds and busi-
ness opportunities, false assertions, misappropriation and conversion, and violation
of federal racketeering laws. See Lendi Complaint, supra note 170.
172. Id. at 10-12.
173. Id. at 10. The complaint alleges that ProServ "exploited Lendl's unique rep-
utation and his ranking as the world's number one tennis player to obtain appear-
ance and merchandising opportunities for lesser known ProServ clients thereby
increasing ProServ's revenues." Id For a short discussion of appearance fees, see
supra note 160.
174. The suit claims that Lendl was under contract with ProServ to pay the com-
pany 7.5% of his income. Other clients were bound with the company for rates of 20
to 25%. Lendl Complaint, supra note 170, at 10. Thus, in an endorsement with Avis,
Inc., Lendl allegedly received less compensation overall, due to Proserv's multiple
clients. The package of negotiations for other ProServ clients-bound to pay higher
commissions-provided a "net overall increase in fees earned by ProServ from other
players." Id. at 11.
175. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
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men's tennis event is the person or entity who is obligated to
pay the expenses of the event, including compensation to the
players. In exchange, the operator is entitled to receive the
revenue generated by the event. Because of the multiple
roles played by ProServ-as operator, owner, sponsor's repre-
sentative and player representative-there arises frequent op-
portunities for ProServ to abuse its position and to exploit the
trust [that] is held by its clients.17
Lendi alleged that since his appearance fees were consist-
ently less than his actual market value, ProServ had exploited
him to maximize its own income.177 Lendl further asserted
that ProServ "fraudulently concealed from plaintiffs
ProServ's conflict of interest in its dual role as operator and
induced Lendl to accept... appearance fee[s] substantially be-
low his usual fee[s] for such . . . event[s].' 17' According to
Lendl, he received smaller fees because of ProServ's multiple
clients, and at times he received no fee at all because ProServ
was allegedly "engaged in a pattern and practice of diverting
business opportunities away from Lendl... to ProServ's other
clients."' 79
G. Dual Representation of Coaches and Players
Representing athletes and coaches in the same league,8 0 es-
pecially on the same team, can also present a potential conflict
of interest.' National Football League (NFL) Commissioner
176. Lendl Complaint, supra note 170, at 12-13.
177. See, e.g., id. at 14-15 (stating that a ProServ-operated event, a Georgia tourna-
ment sponsored by AT&T, "induced" Lendl to accept an appearance fee of $150,000
for the five-day event, when Lendl's normal fee, "had it been negotiated at arm's
length, would have been at least twice that amount"). In a 1988 exhibition event in
Osaka, Japan, Lendl received $60,000 as an appearance fee, when the "market value
for Lendl's appearance was $100,000." Md at 7. It was reported that Lendl discovered
this discrepancy after his split with ProServ, and later ProServ agreed to an $85,000
fee. Muiz, supra note 170, at 3.
178. Lendl Complaint, supra note 170, at 14.
179. Id. at 16 (stating that Lendl, with the lowest rate of commission of all of
ProServ's clients, suffered because endorsement opportunities were "diverted ... to
... lesser ranked, but higher paying, client[s] in order to maximize the commission
fees ProServ would be entitled to receive").
180. For conflict issues when a dual representation includes management employ-
ees that actively take part in the negotiations of player contracts, see infra notes
193-97 and accompanying text.
181. See Neff, supra note 1, at 84 (stating that serving management and labor on
the same team can cause problems, and raising the question of attorney Robert Fra-
ley's representation of Philadelphia Eagles' coach Buddy Ryan and a Philadelphia
player, Jerome Brown); Rosenblatt, Robert Fraley: If You Coach, Play or Run a
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Pete Rozelle claims that such representation can "cause signif-
icant problems"182 and that clubs should "seriously consider
adopting policies directed at avoiding these troublesome situa-
tions." ' Simultaneous representation presents the appear-
ance of a conflict in several situations. Depending on the
circumstances, such a dual representation may also rise to an
actual conflict.
1. Potential Conflict of Interest
Procuring employment for one player with another team
necessarily takes that talent away from the player's current
team, possibly damaging that team's (and coach's) win-loss
record. If a lawyer represents both the relocated athlete and
the possibly damaged coach, a potential conflict of interest ex-
ists. 184 The likelihood of such a conflict increases if the partic-
ular professional league allows for liberal player mobility.18 5
Team, He Will Represent You, SPORTS INC., Feb. 22, 1988, at 24 (stating that each
time a lawyer surfaces as a representative for both NFL coaches and players, the
question of conflict of interest is raised).
182. See Appendix (Memorandum from Pete Rozelle to NFL Club Presidents
(Sept. 4, 1987) (regarding multiple representation of player and non-player employ-
ees)) [hereinafter Rozelle Memorandum].
183. Rozelle Memorandum, Appendix. Rozelle's claims, like the majority of con-
flict of interest accusations, are grounded on breaches of loyalty and confidentiality.
He also makes the distinction between agents and lawyers, and states that applicable
bar associations "only partially meet the problem." Id. Although stating that such
representation is "suspicious," Rozelle does acknowledge that any ethical improprie-
ties "can usually be avoided altogether by full disclosure to all interested parties."
Id.
In the author's opinion, the Commissioner has made several valid points concern-
ing possible conflict of interest when representing both players and coaches in the
NFL. However, arguably, one portion of his memorandum is misplaced. The Com-
missioner stated that this dual representation allows players to be "delivered" to
another team by the lawyer, due to the lawyer's "relationship with a particular club
official." See Rozelle Memorandum, Appendix. The only possible concern is that
the lawyer's power may encroach on that of the league office. This concern does not
relate to conflict of interest-at least not the type traditionally discussed in the area
of ethics. An actual conflict of interest has very little to do with a lawyer's ability to
relocate a client. In the situation alluded to by the Commissioner, the lawyer's cli-
ents (coach and player) can only benefit from such a relocation. The lawyer's scope
of representation, see infra notes 249-61 and accompanying text, does not include
such league concerns.
184. See Rozelle Memorandum, Appendix (alluding to this conflict of interest sce-
nario). See also Neff, supra note 1, at 84.
185. As a practical matter, this issue is not as much of a concern in the NFL,
where there is a lack of player movement. See supra note 101. This must be com-
pared to a sport like baseball, where there is generally more freedom of movement.
See supra note 100.
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Wide disagreement between a lawyer and a team during
contract negotiations for a player's salary may necessitate a
player's extended holdout from participation with the team. If
a lawyer's client list includes that team's coach, the lawyer is
susceptible to a conflict of interest. 8 6 Such a scenario must be
compared to the situation in which independent lawyers rep-
resent the player and the coach where questions of a lawyer's
unfettered loyalty do not arise.1 8 7
Other disputes with the team, in addition to this extended
holdout situation, may subject the lawyer to a potential con-
flict of interest. For example, if an injured player cannot es-
tablish that the injury arose in the course of his contract
performance, his team may not compensate him.88 The player
can then bring suit against his former team to recover the bal-
ance of his playing contract.8 9 By representing the player and
the team's coach, the lawyer creates an appearance of a con-
flict or at least diverse or discordant interests.90 This appear-
ance may also be created when an athlete is terminated by his
employer.'9 ' The lawyer's potential conflict of interest is evi-
dent if the coach becomes actively involved in a dispute over a
186. Depending on the skills of the player, the coach has a strong interest in the
player taking part in training camp and all regular season games because the coach
might be without a major contributor to the win-loss record and overall success of
that particular season. In this circumstance, the lawyer is presented with a potential
conflict of interest.
187. But see infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text (scope of a sports lawyer's
representation typically does not include the responsibility of supplying talent).
188. The team's duty to compensate the athlete for medical expenses incurred
and salary lost when the player is injured is often disputed. Most professional sports
contracts state that the team is obligated for these expenses only (1) when the ath-
lete proves that the injury arose from performing his contract, and (2) when notice
of the injury was given within a time period specified in the agreement. See gener-
ally J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.06, at 223.
189. This common player grievance is essentially a question of causation:
whether the cause of the injury was related directly to the athlete's participation in
practice or competition under the current contract, or was a result of some action or
condition which arose prior to the contract or in the course of an off-the-field activ-
ity. I&.
190. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 181, at 26 (reporting a possible conflict of
interest over a player's injury, due to the involvement of the coach-also repre-
sented by the same lawyer-in the proceedings).
191. Standard player contracts typically provide several grounds for the team to
terminate its relationship with the athlete. The club could end the relationship "if
the athlete (1) is not physically fit, (2) fails to exhibit sufficient skill and ability in
the particular sport, (3) fails to observe club and league rules, including disciplinary
rules, or (4) otherwise materially breaches the contract." J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL,
supra note 1, § 3.07, at 236.
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proper termination.'92
2. Actual Conflict of Interest
The potential conflict from the dual representation of
coaches and players may, in some instances, rise to an actual
conflict of interest.'93 As with many of the possible conflict
scenarios, such a dilemma occurs during the lawyer's salary
negotiations with the team on the player's behalf. The role of
team negotiator, at least in the three major professional sports
leagues, is not customarily served by a member of the club's
on-the-field staff. 9 4 If the particular coach, as part of his job,
takes an active role in these negotiations, the lawyer en-
counters an actual conflict. 95 When a represented coach
192. For example, in various professional leagues, whether the athlete is in
proper physical condition or has the requisite degree of skill is customarily submit-
ted to the discretion of the team's coach. Id at 237. The standard form player con-
tract utilized in the NFL prior to 1977 provided that a team could terminate an
athlete
if, in the opinion of the Head Coach, Player does not maintain himself in
such excellent physical condition or fails at any time during the football
seasons included in the terms of this contract to demonstrate sufficient skill
and capacity to play professional football of the caliber required by the
League, or by the Club, or if in the opinion of the Head Coach the Player's
work or conduct in the performance of this contract is unsatisfactory as
compared with the work and conduct of other members of the Club's squad
of players, the Club shall have the right to terminate this contract.
Id. (citing NFL Standard Player Contract, § 6 (1975)). The current standard contract
in the NFL does not make specific mention of the opinion of coaches; however, as
players in that league currently may be terminated for lack of skill or detrimental
conduct to the team "in the sole judgment of [the] Club," coaches will still make
final determinations as to the athlete's termination, thereby continuing the potential
conflict of interest. See NFL Standard Player Contract, § 11 (1987) (Skill, Perform-
ance and Conduct). Similarly, when a coach recommends disciplinary measures
against a player, the lawyer's undivided loyalty may be brought into question. This
was a factor in leading a committee of NBA players to prohibit the dual representa-
tion of players and coaches in that league. See infra notes 205-09 and accompanying
text.
193. While the potential conflicts from the dual representation of players and
coaches, see supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text, would be less likely to man-
date lawyer disqualification, the more paramount concern between the "potential"
and "actual" conflict distinction is initially recognizing the existence of a possible
conflict at all. See supra note 99.
194. Such negotiations typically are conducted by the team's general manager, or
by persons with titles such as chief negotiator or financial officer. Some teams re-
tain outside counsel for the sole purpose of conducting contract negotiations.
195. This actual conflict of interest has been alluded to in a memorandum to
league presidents from the Commissioner of the NFL. See Rozelle Memorandum,
Appendix (players disadvantaged by the dual representation "particularly, but not
exclusively [when the management official is] involved in... contract negotiations").
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makes decisions regarding the compensation level of individ-
ual players, the interests of the lawyer's player-client and
coaching-client are pitted against each other. The interests of
the lawyer's clients could clearly become so "differing"' 9 that
disqualification would be the proper course.1
9 7
3. Reaction From Governing Bodies
League players associations 98 expressly prohibit concurrent
representation of players and certain management person-
nel." The most obvious conflict of interest occurs when a
lawyer actually holds a financial interest in the team, while
simultaneously representing players in the same league. °°
Governing bodies differ when addressing lawyers and agents
196. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
197. Player representatives encounter other conflicts of interest in addition to
player-coach dual representation. An unquestioned conflict would result if a lawyer
concurrently represented players and a team or team owner in the same league.
Similar to those coaches that take an active role in negotiating individual player con-
tracts, teams have a vested interest in the salary structure of their employee-players.
198. League players associations regulate agents and lawyers by certification pro-
grams. Standard regulatory schemes, at least insofar as the three major professional
sports league players associations are concerned, make no distinction between agents
and lawyers. See Sobel, supra note 1, at 731, 734. See generally R. BERRY & G.
WONG, LAw AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 213-23 (1986) (including
NFLPA regulations).
199. As players associations' agent certification schemes govern lawyers, these
regulations quite obviously provide members of the legal profession with an addi-
tional set of guidelines, along with the ABA Code and Model Rules. As for conflict
of interest, provisions from these two governing standards will occasionally overlap.
For example, the NFLPA requires the dual representation of players and coaches to
be disclosed and consented to in writing, see infra notes 237-38 and accompanying
text. Disclosure and consent provisions under the Model Rules, see infra notes 211-
19 and accompanying text, would likewise apply to this multiple representation situ-
ation, and may or may not dictate that the consent be in writing. But see irkfra notes
231-38 and accompanying text (recommending that potential conflicts in the sports
representation area be disclosed and consented to in writing). It is clear that the
higher standards of the legal profession will more often than not be the appropriate
ethical standard for sports lawyers. Many of the conflicts outlined by this Article,
therefore, will require more in-depth disclosure (or even lawyer disqualification),
regardless of the players association regulation (or lack thereof) applying to the par-
ticular multiple representation scenario.
200. See NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 78, § 5(B)(1); NBPA REGULATIONS,
supra note 104, § 3(B)(e); MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION REGULA-
TIONS GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS § 3(B)(5) (1988) [hereinafter MLBPA REGULA.
TIONS]. See, e.g., Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(sports agent holding a financial interest in the team with which player-client was
negotiating). A lawyer that represents players concurrently with a team owner in
the same league, as mentioned supra note 199, would clearly fall under this general
prohibition.
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that undertake the dual representation of players and coaches.
The NFLPA 0 1 and the MLBPA20 2 do not expressly prohibit
such a representation. The MLBPA reviews this dual repre-
sentation on a case-by-case basis, and considers such factors as
the nature of the negotiations, who the individual coach is, and
what authority he has.2°s Although the initial presumption is
not to allow such a representation, the lawyer will have an
opportunity to convince the players association that the rela-
tionship will not be damaging.20 4
The NBPA, on the other hand, prohibits the dual represen-
tation of players and coaches or general managers.05 A com-
mittee of players 206 made this determination based on several
of their perceived problems with player and coach representa-
tion. One concern is that when a coach recommends discipli-
nary measures against a player, the agent or lawyer will be
unable to focus her full attention on the player's interest.2 7
The NBPA's concerns reflect the ethical rules in this area
generally: the best interests of one player mean that his agent
201. This league allows the simultaneous representation of players and coaches as
long as there is full disclosure and client consent. See infra notes 237-38 and accom-
panying text.
202. Under the MLBPA scheme, player agents may be subject to disciplinary ac-
tion for "[b]eing employed by, serving as an officer of, or representing, either di-
rectly or indirectly, Major League Baseball, the American or National Leagues, any
Club or affiliated entity, or representing, either directly or indirectly, any manage-
ment or supervisory level employee or official of them, without the prior written
authorization of the MLBPA." MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 200, § 3(B)(6)
(emphasis added).
203. Comments by Gene Orza, Associate General Counsel, MLBPA, at annual
Player Agent Seminar, in New York City (July 8, 1988).
Long-standing relationships, for example, will be recognized and respected.
Many baseball players go straight into coaching, and this must be taken into
consideration; take for example, Pete Rose, who has had the same agent for
21 years. Simple logic tells you that you can't burn all bridges; representa-
tion will be allowed under certain circumstances.
Id.
204. Id
205. The NBPA prohibits player agents from "[r]epresenting the General Man-
ager or coach of any NBA team (or any other management representative who par-
ticipates in the team's deliberations or decision concerning what compensation is to
be offered individual players) in matters pertaining to his employment by or associa-
tion with any NBA team." NBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 104, § 3(B)(f).
206. The Committee on Agent Registration and Regulation was made up of
league players Alex English, Rolando Blackman, Junior Bridgeman, Quinn Buckner,
Norm Nixon, Jim Paxson, and Isiah Thomas.
207. Telephone interview with George Cohen, Legal Counsel to the NBPA Com-
mittee on Agent Registration and Regulation (Aug. 3, 1988) [hereinafter Cohen
Interview].
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or lawyer should devote undivided loyalty to that player. 20 8
This express prohibition does not necessarily preclude the
representation of an NBA coach outside of contract negotia-
tions or team matters. Counsel regarding other matters, such
as endorsement opportunities or general legal work, would be
permissible. The NBPA rules expressly state that the forbid-
den dual representation concerns only cases "pertaining to
[the coach's] employment or association with any team.'"209
III
Avoiding the Improprieties of a Conflict of
Interest
As the previous section of this Article indicates, there are
numerous potential and actual conflicts of interest possibilities
facing sports representatives. A lawyer's first duty is to recog-
nize such conflicts.21 0 Following this, the lawyer must con-
front other issues. This section outlines ways to avoid actual
conflicts of interest and possible disqualification and provides
an analysis of the applicable ethical rules.
A. Client Consent After Full Disclosure
The ethical rules do not state that any potential conflict of
interest automatically precludes a lawyer from undertaking a
representation. Such an automatic application of the ethical
rules would violate freedom of contract21 and personal auton-
omy-the basic right of a client to select which lawyer he be-
208. Id "The solution to disallow representation of coaches was really decided on
by the players because they wanted all agents that represent their interests to pro-
vide complete loyalty." d Those formulating this rule did not feel that a compro-
mise stance could be taken, such as allowing consent to the dual representation by
fully informing the player of the extent of the coach's representation. "The Com-
mittee [on Agent Registration and Regulation] was not concerned with the issues of
consent or waiver, or whether or not it is more than an 'appearance' of a conflict or
an 'actual' conflict." Id. The NFLPA did reach such a compromise position. See
infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 205. "[A]reas outside of this scope, such as an endorsement
agreement for a coach, or other similar areas, would likely be held to be outside the
employment agreement area, and permissible. We have not had a ruling on that
point as of now." Cohen Interview, supra note 207.
210. Along with full disclosure of and client consent to the lawyer's multiple rep-
resentation, this initial recognition by the lawyer of a conflict of interest is the para-
mount concern in terms of lawyer propriety. See supra notes 97-99 and
accompanying text.
211. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 339.
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lieves is the most qualified to pursue his various legal
entitlements. From a lawyer's point of view, this autonomy
reflects "a client's interest in having certain subjective, nonle-
gal goals recognized as both valid and important." '212 Such
goals include the right of every client to "choose his strategy,
plot his fate and rise or fall by his own choices. 213
The 1969 ABA Code, under DR 5-105(C), sets the standard
for allowing lawyers with a potential conflict between multi-
ple clients to obtain client consent. First, the lawyer must
"obvious[ly]" be able to adequately represent both clients' in-
terests.214 Second, he must secure consent from each client
likely to be adversely affected, "after full disclosure of the
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his in-
dependent professional judgment. '215
The Model Rules also require the lawyer to initially deter-
mine if he can adequately represent both clients. This deci-
sion mandates that the lawyer "reasonably believe" that
simultaneous representation will not adversely affect either
client. The dual representation can then continue only if
"each client consents after Consultation. ' 21 6
The two professional standards require the lawyer to make
a good faith determination that representing both clients is
proper.217 The question nevertheless remains: When can the
lawyer "obviously" or "reasonably believe" that he can ade-
quately represent the interests of both clients? The comments
212. Moore, supra note 36, at 233-34.
213. Id. at 234 n.114 (citing Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the
American Trial Judge, 64 VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1978)). Autonomy also involves a cli-
ent's freedom to make his own choices, including the freedom to choose unwisely.
Considering this meaning, a lawyer violates clients' autonomy not only if he unilat-
erally determines that multiple representation would be improper, but also if he
permits the clients to consent after first determining that it is in their best interests
to do so. Id. at 234. The lawyer, recognizing this autonomy, must then determine if
multiple representation will be "adequate" under the Model Rules. See MODEL
RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.7. See also supra text accompanying note 68.
214. ABA CODE, supra note 35, DR 5-105(C).
215. Id.
216. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.7.
217. There will likely be certain circumstances when a conflict is "nonconsent-
able," thus never requiring a lawyer to make this initial good faith determination.
Commentators have stated that both the ABA Code and the Model Rules are inade-
quate in their treatment of the specific situations when a conflict is nonconsentable.
See Moore, supra note 36, at 240. The proper focus is not on what the reasonable
lawyer believes (as the rules state); rather, the issue is "the conditions under which a
client would probably have agreed to relinquish his freedom to decide the question
for himself." Id.
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to Rule 1.7 suggest that the final decision in such a situation
should be made by a "disinterested lawyer." This detached
decisionmaker may conclude that "the client should not agree
to the representation under the circumstances.""21 If this is
the case, it would be improper for the lawyer involved to ask
for the clients' consent. This hypothetical disinterested ad-
viser does not actually have to be consulted, however, leaving
the standard once again subject to the lawyer's good faith. 19
B. Guidelines for the Sports Lawyer
Lawyers in sports representation, like all general practition-
ers, must be adept at identifying any potentially conflicting
representation and must take steps in advance to avoid impro-
prieties.220  As a practical matter, some conflicts may be re-
solved by informally disclosing all relevant factors to the
various clients being represented. This would be advisable, for
instance, if the lawyer's client list includes athletes on the
same team or coaches in the same sport.221
A threshhold issue facing large law firms is determining
who actually are the firm's clients.222 Just as a large law firm
compares the participants in "new matters" against its existing
client list, a sports lawyer should also compare potential new
clients to a roster of existing clients.
If a potential conflict exists, a determination must be made
as to whether the lawyer can represent both clients. This de-
cision must be made under the "disinterested lawyer" stan-
218. MODEL RULES, supra note 35, Rule 1.7 comment (Consultation and Consent).
219. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 36, at 341 (lawyer "burdened with the conflict is
to assess in a dispassionate way whether to undertake the representation").
Although this standard is "rather transparent" and "not much of a test at all," law-
yers under the Model Rules approach are provided with some type of objective stan-
dard, whatever the lawyer's subjective intentions. Id.
220. See generally R. RUXIN, supra note 14, at 71-74. Ruxin suggests that the ath-
lete obtain a third opinion from an uninvolved person, such as a non-sports lawyer.
Assuming the lawyer does not disqualify himself, the final determination of repre-
sentation rests with the athlete, even with the potential conflict. The test is whether
the lawyer can separate and carry out his functions as if all his clients were repre-
sented by different lawyers. Id at 74.
221. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.19, at 329 ("The fact that
[lawyers] may represent several players with one club is usually well-known and is
presumably accepted by new clients."). Other conflicts must be handled on a more
formal basis. For example, the dual representation of players and coaches in the
NFL requires certain disclosures in writing. See infra notes 237-38 and accompany-
ing text.
222. See, e.g., Miller & Warren, supra note 61, at 661.
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dard223 before the lawyer is formally retained. This initial
matter will depend on the particular situation and relevant
factors. Generally, though, both clients must have a clear un-
derstanding of the advantages and disadvantages of the re-
quested multiple representation.224 If the lawyer concludes
that dual representation can be maintained, the consent of
both clients after full disclosure must be obtained.
1. Degree of Knowledge Required
The actual request for consent is crucial. In Detroit Lions v.
Argovitz, 225 the court defined the degree of knowledge and un-
derstanding that clients must possess to be fully informed of a
potential conflict. The conflict in Detroit Lions did not in-
volve two clients with differing interests; rather, it involved a
sports agent's conflict of interest and the corresponding gen-
eral fiduciary principles of agency law.226 Such principles are
not as rigid as the ethical rules facing members of the legal
profession, and thus, the case must be interpreted in that light.
Merely informing the client of a general conflicting interest
is inadequate to effectively obtain client consent and continue
with the representation.227 Rather, a lawyer must "inform the
[client] of all facts that come to his knowledge that are or may
223. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
224. Moore, supra note 36, at 240 (stating that the decisions ultimately made as to
the advantages of the representation must not in fact be based on "psychological or
economic stress, such that the client would probably later regret being coerced into
an unwise decision"). This commentator has urged a "capacity for informed and vol-
untary consent" standard for determining the permissibility of multiple representa-
tion in conflict of interest situations. In determining whether dual representation
can be maintained, the foremost inquiry is into the advantages and disadvantages to
the client. Id. Of course, in the sports representation industry, the nature of the
parties must be considered, along with the custom within the particular sport and
the industry in general. Compare J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.19, at
329 ("While a formal disclosure of the potential competing interest is the preferred
mode, the client's approval may be implied if joint representation is customary in the
particular trade.").
225. Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542, 548-49 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
For a more complete discussion of the facts and holding of this case, see supra notes
81-96 and accompanying text.
226. For a discussion of these principles for sports agents, see supra notes 75-79
and accompanying text.
227. The client in this case, Billy Sims, was actually aware of the agent's con-
flict-that the agent was a part-owner of the football team with which he was nego-
tiating. Sims was in fact present at the press conference when the agent announced
that his application for a franchise had been approved. Detroit Lions, 580 F. Supp. at
544 (but stating that Sims "did not know the extent of [the agent's] interest in the
[team]").
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be material or which might affect his [client's] right and inter-
est or influence the action that he takes. '228
The standard given by the court is rigid. One commentator
described it as follows: "The impression is left that the court
requires a level of disclosure so exacting that it is difficult to
imagine a reasonable person continuing to agree to be repre-
sented by the agent with the conflict. '229  Despite this strict
standard of disclosure, the court did not rule out the possibil-
ity of the agent continuing with the representation, assuming
he could prove that adequate information was relayed to the
client.3 0
2. Form of Consent
The majority of conflicts of interest, when sports lawyers
represent competing client interests, 23 ' or simultaneously rep-
resent players and coaches,23 2 will fall under the catch-all pro-
visions of the applicable players association agent regulation
scheme.33 For example, the NFLPA's provision forbids
agents and lawyers from "[e]ngaging in any other activity
which creates an actual or potential conflict of interest with
the effective representation of NFL players. 2 3 4 While these
regulations call for lawyers to vigorously represent their cli-
228. Id at 548 (quoting Anderson v. Griffith, 501 S.W.2d 695, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973)).
229. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.19, at 53 (Supp. 1985).
230. All facts that would have influenced Sims' decision to sign with the team
were required to be fully disclosed to him by his agent. Those noted by the court
include the following: The relative values of the contracts with both teams with
which he was negotiating; the significant financial differences between the two com-
peting leagues (that the NFL was more financially stable, and offered more fringe
benefits); the actual ownership interest of the sports agent (including his salary with
the team); and that Sims currently enjoyed "great leverage," which was not being
taken advantage of by the agent. Detroit Lions, 580 F. Supp. at 549.
231. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 180-209 and accompanying text.
233. Such certification schemes generally do not distinguish between sports
agents and lawyers. See supra note 198. In this situation, players association
schemes overlap with the ABA Code and Model Rules provisions for conflict of in-
terest. Both standards, of course, must be considered by lawyers encountering po-
tential conflicts. See supra note 199.
234. NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 78, § 5(B)(2). See also NBPA REGULA-
TIONS, supra note 104, § 3(B)(g) (player agents prohibited from "[e]ngaging in any
other activity which creates an actual or potential conflict of interest with the effec-
tive representation of NBA players"); MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 200,
§ 3(B)(8) ("[e]ngaging in any other activity which, in the Association's judgment, cre-
ates an actual or potential conflict of interest with the effective representation of
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ents, they do not include corresponding guidance as to the
form of client consent. The form of client consent will depend
on the circumstances, as with other potential conflicts guided
by the ABA Code and Model Rules, such as event manage-
ment235 and representation of a players association.23 6 It is ad-
visable, as a general guideline, for this consent to be in
writing. This precautionary measure may appear unnecessary
for some of the potential conflict scenarios, but for protection,
lawyers should err on the side of safety.
The dual representation of management officials such as
coaches and players, under several players associations
schemes, must be expressly consented to in writing.3 7 In
practice, this particular potential conflict is handled by the
lawyer furnishing a form that lists any management personnel
represented, both past and present. The list is attached to the
representation agreement between the lawyer and athlete,
with both signing that page. The NFLPA's disclosure and con-
sent provision was adopted as a compromise position between
the various contending factions.3 8
Players; provided that the representation of two or more players on any one Club
shall not per se violate this provision").
Similar conflict of interest regulations prohibit agents and lawyers from engaging
in any "business venture" that creates an actual or potential conflict of interest be-
tween the representative and the player. See, e.g., NBPA REGULATIONS, supra note
104, § 3(B)(e); MLBPA REGULATIONS, supra note 200, § 3(B)(5). This general provi-
sion could apply to the potential conflict of interest when lawyers engage in procur-
ing and negotiating endorsements for sports clients. See supra notes 111-24 and
accompanying text. Although the lawyer may delegate such endorsement services
to, for example, an endorsement company, she may play a role in such a company.
See supra note 119.
235. See supra notes 150-79 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
237. See NFLPA REGULATIONS, supra note 78, § 5(B)(2) (stating that a contract
advisor is prohibited from "[flailing to disclose in writing to a player, prior to ac-
cepting representation of such player, the names and current positions of any NFL
management personnel whom he or she has represented or is representing in mat-
ters pertaining to their employment by or association with any NFL team").
The Canadian Football League Players Association has remarkably similar provi-
sions regarding conflicts of interest, including a requirement for written disclosure
prior to accepting representation of players and management personnel. See CFLPA
REGULATIONS GOVERNING CONTRACT ADVISORS, Art. IV, §§ (8)-(10) (1985) (Code of
Conduct). The similar MLBPA scheme requires express written approval by the
players association. See supra note 202.
238. Telephone interview with Dick Berthelsen, NFLPA General Counsel (Aug.
1, 1988):
When we dealt with the conflict problem of representing coaches and
players, we felt that we could not single out someone in that role. What we
ended up with was the current disclosure provision. As a result of this set-
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3. Lawyer Discretion Governs Conflicts
It could be argued that, based on the Detroit Lions23 9 case,
most otherwise apparent conflicts of interest in sports repre-
sentation could still be undertaken by lawyers. This is assum-
ing, of course, that proper disclosure has been made and client
consent has been obtained.240 Detroit Lions concerned as clear
a conflict of interest as is imaginable: a part-owner of a team
negotiated on behalf of an athlete against that team.241 The
court, though, held that the concurrent representation would
still have been permissible if proper disclosure had been
made.2" Under this reasoning, other potential conflicts, such
as competing player interests, or representing coaches and
players, would likewise be allowable under certain cir-
cumstances.243
The rules of ethics give discretion to those lawyers facing
potential conflicts. Under the Model Rules, as previously dis-
cussed,2" lawyers are obligated to "reasonably believe" that
representation of one client will not "adversely affect" repre-
sentation of another client. 45 Similarly, under the ABA Code,
lawyers must "obvious[ly]" be able to adequately represent
tlement type provision, the player, by signing the disclosure statement,
waives any right to later complaining that his agent is subject to a conflict.
Id For a discussion of the treatment of this multiple representation scenario in Ma-
jor League Baseball and the NBA, see supra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
See also Rosenblatt, supra note 181, at 24-26 (including various arguments on both
sides of the player-coach representation issue in the NFL).
239. See supra notes 80-96 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
243. The conflict of interest situations in the sports representation industry do
not typically involve actual courtroom confrontations. At a minimum, this can be
interpreted as presenting more ambiguity in the ethical rules, and allowing more
discretion on the part of the lawyer representing multiple clients. See, e.g., Note,
Outside the Courtroom: Conflicts of Interests in Nonlitigious Situations, 37 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 161, 163 (1980) ("The [ethics rules] and present case law, however, do
not adequately distinguish between litigious and nonlitigious representation and,
therefore, fail to address the problems peculiar to conflicts of interests arising in
nonlitigious circumstances."). See also ABA CODE, supra note 35, EC 5-15 (stating
that there are few instances in which a lawyer representing multiple clients in litiga-
tion would be justified to continue, yet in matters not involving litigation, a lawyer-
if the interests at issue vary only slightly-will be able to continue). In the case of
sports clients such as players and coaches, the application of the rules of ethics is less
clear-cut, as often representation is solely of a non-litigious nature.
244. See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
245. See supra text accompanying note 68. See also supra notes 216-19 and accom-
panying text.
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both clients.246 These standards, arguably only tests of the cli-
ent's "best interests, '247 leave the determination to the law-
yer's good faith.248
4. Overriding Issue: Scope of Representation
In all of the conflict of interest situations outlined by this
Article, lawyers are left with a standard under Model Rule 1.7
of whether they "reasonably believe" that a potential conflict
will "materially interfere" with their "independent profes-
sional judgment. '24  The transcending issue throughout con-
flicts in sports representation is the lawyer's scope of
representation.20 A lawyer must fully define his scope of rep-
resentation, since his obligations only attach to certain serv-
ices. Once the lawyer's representational capacity is outlined
and fully disclosed and consented to by multiple clients,25 ' the
obligations that arise become more apparent. It is at this point
that a lawyer may reasonably believe that multiple represen-
tation may continue.
An illustration of the lawyer's scope of representation is
where a lawyer concurrently represents a coach and a player,
the latter of whom is engaged in a "holdout" from participa-
tion with the team, due to a salary dispute.252 Even though a
player holdout may possibly hurt the success of that team's
and coach's season,253 the lawyer's services provided to her cli-
ent who is a coach, typically do not include the supplying of
talent.254 Once the lawyer fully discloses the extent of the
multiple representation, the situation will not rise to an actual
conflict of interest.255
246. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
250. Compare J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, § 3.19, at 330 ("Thus, the
parties may undertake, by formal contract, tacit agreement, or trade custom, to de-
fine the agent's obligation in particular circumstances.").
251. See supra notes 211-48 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 186.
254. Similarly, the lawyer who assists in relocating a player with a new team, to
the detriment of the represented coach, see supra notes 184-85 and accompanying
text, does not typically possess the duty of supplying the coach with talent.
255. The lawyer's full disclosure to a player would include any realistic conse-
quences of simultaneously representing the player's coach (or any coach in the same
league). For example, would the coach exert any influence on the lawyer such that
it might impair the vigorous representation of the player? Would the lawyer feel
[Vol. 11:165
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The competing player scenario 2 5 illustrates the magnitude
of this role-defining requirement. A lawyer may be in a posi-
tion to bolster one player's status with management so that
the player receives more playing time or salary incentives.
Obviously, the realities of this situation must be discussed
with both players. 257 By disclosing the status-raising possibil-
ity to both clients, the lawyers' scope of representation is nar-
rowed. Both clients are thus fully aware of whom he is
retaining; a client at this juncture could hardly argue that he
is the victim of a conflict of interest.
Similarly, when representing competing coaches interview-
ing for the same job,258 the posture of the lawyer will not typi-
cally be that of influencing the decisionmakers for that
position.259 Overall, the duty of the lawyer is not actually to
secure employment, but to negotiate for benefits once the
coach is at that particular position. Of course, the lawyer must
scrutinize his role. First, his situation must be fully under-
stood and consented to by all coaches. Second, despite having
received full consent to the multiple representation, the law-
yer must determine whether his clients can in fact be ade-
quately represented or would instead be more beneficially
represented by separate counsel.2 °
If the lawyer's role includes an influencing aspect-such as
a salesman to influence a university or other selection commit-
tee-the representation has expanded beyond acceptable lim-
pressure from the coach in certain circumstances? The practical effect of these situ-
ations, as well as other relevant questions, all must be disclosed in detailed form to
the player. Once disclosure has been made, and a knowing consent given, the client
will have waived the right to claim conflict of interest.
When advising an amateur athlete on the prospects of entering the professional
draft prior to the expiration of the athlete's amateur eligibility, see supra notes 140-
44 and accompanying text, the lawyer is also obligated to disclose any personal inter-
est the lawyer may have in possibly acquiring a new client. This disclosure of a
possible conflict of interest accompanies other duties of the lawyer, such as making a
due diligence search among coaches, scouts, and experts in the sports, as to the ath-
lete's professional potential. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
257. As a practical matter, few in the representation industry will take these es-
sential steps. The industry's ethical and moral standards have generally fallen below
the standards of the legal profession.
258. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
259. The lawyer representing multiple coaches in this situation will normally be
interested only after the decision has been made to hire the coach.
260. The lawyer's discretion is a crucial aspect in the initial determination of the
propriety of any potentially conflicting representation. See supra notes 239-48 and
accompanying text.
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its and the lawyer must resign. At such a point, the lawyer
cannot "reasonably believe," under the Model Rules, that one
representation will not materially limit the lawyer's responsi-
bilities to another client.261
Once again, the issue of conflict of interest is one of role
defining and narrowing. Both lawyer and client must be in
complete mutual understanding as to just what purpose the
lawyer is hired to fulfill. This process is vital in avoiding a
conflict of interest.
Conclusion
Lawyers' conflict of interest in sports representation has be-
come increasingly widespread. The "differing interest" scena-
rios cover not only many sports, but also a broad range of
issues within each sport.
Sports lawyers confront these conflicts at every stage of rep-
resentation. The lawyer's interest in gaining a client could
cloud the objectivity necessary in advising an eligible NCAA
student-athlete on the prospects of a professional career.
Other interests may also interfere with the lawyer's represen-
tation of a client. First, the particular fee calculation method
chosen requires scrutiny because of the inherent opportunity
for a conflict. This area of concern has application both to
player salary negotiation and to off-the-field sources of in-,
come, such as product endorsements.
Second, competing interests among a lawyer's existing cli-
ents may present potential conflicts. This must be contrasted
with those opportunities for a lawyer's personal interests to
interfere with representation of the client. These "outside in-
terest" scenarios may include two player-clients battling over
one roster spot, or multiple assistant coaches seeking the same
position.
A related area is the dual representation of coaches and
players. This potential conflict can occur during the player's
contract negotiation (such as in a holdout scenario), as well as
at a later point, as when a veteran player signs with another
club to the detriment of his former coach.
Two other conflict situations also arise in sports representa-
tion. Some lawyers have simultaneously represented both a
league players association and player-members of that union;
261. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 35, Rule 1.7.
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the lawyer's ability to provide a "vigorous" representation in
this situation is questionable. A more common occurrence is
the issue of "event management." Lawyers, as well as agents,
who currently work for sports management firms not only in-
vent and manage tournaments, but they also represent the in-
dividual competitors at that event.
One purpose of this Article is to illustrate that a genuine
potential for conflict of interest exists when applying the ABA
Code and Model Rules to many situations. However, merely
recognizing the possibility of a differing interest does not nec-
essarily dictate the finding of an "actual conflict" and the re-
sulting lawyer disqualification. Lawyers may, at the outset,
thoroughly communicate to their clients their scope of repre-
sentation. This communication must include proper disclosure
of the lawyer's various interests. Once an informed client con-
sents to the situation, it is possible, depending on the circum-
stances, for a lawyer to "reasonably believe" that such
interests will not "adversely" affect the adequate representa-
tion of the particular client.
Despite the lively debate over the conflict situations in
sports representation, not every such instance mandates a per
se rule of lawyer disqualification. Automatically barring a
lawyer from representing competing player interests would
have excessively far-reaching results. -For one, it would limit
clients' access to experienced counsel. The client may feel
that the benefits of an experienced lawyer in sports matters
would, as a whole, outweigh the drawbacks caused by poten-
tial differing interests. Basic notions of client autonomy de-
mand that the client be allowed to make such decisions.
In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of
ethical concerns facing sports lawyers. In addition to specific
instances of unethical conduct, in an overall sense the morals
of the "industry" of sports representation have fallen far be-
low the standards of the legal profession. Because of this, the
1980s will be known as a decade of legislation, regulation, and
generally increased scrutiny of those who represent athletes
and other sports personalities. This trend calls for increased
emphasis on professional ethics for lawyers in this area.
1989]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
Appendix
Sept. 4, 1987
MEMORANDUM TO: NFL Club Presidents
Re: Player Agents - Multiple Representation of Player and
Non-Player Employees
Several clubs have raised questions about the propriety of
an agent representing both players and coaches or other man-
agement employees of NFL clubs.
In my view, common representation of players and manage-
ment employees can cause significant problems and should be
avoided. At the least, such situations create an appearance ofimpropriety that can be detrimental to particular clubs or to
the league as a whole.
One result can be player dissatisfaction. When a playerlearns that his agent also represents a club management offi-
cial (particularly, but not exclusively, one involved in person-
nel decisions or contract negotiations), the player may have
reason to suspect that his agent is "low-balling" him because
of the agent's relationship with management. Such suspicions
could affect the player's morale and performance, produce de-
mands for contract renegotiations, or both.
Sports league player unions are properly suspicious of this
type of common representation. The NFL Players Associa-
tion has a rule requiring NFLPA-certified agents to disclose
to* their player-clients any representation of club officials.
The Major League Baseball Players Association is exploring
even stronger rules in this area; MLBPA union head Donald
Fehr has called such conflicting representations "intolerable."
The State of Texas has even gone so far as to propose legis-
lation (currently pending) which would make it illegal for aplayer agent to receive compensation from a professional
sports league, franchise, or employee.
While agents who are attorneys are subject to conflict-of-
interest sanctions under the professional-responsibility rules
of their respective bar associations, those rules only partially
meet the problem. Where agents are not licensed attorneys,
they are not subject to the rules at all. Further, the right to
voice objections rests primarily with the agent's clients; NFL
clubs do not necessarily have standing to enforce bar associa-
tions' conflict-of-interest rules. Finally, these ethical prohibi-
tions can usually be avoided altogether by full disclosure to all
interested parties.
Representation of both players and management employees
carries the potential for other abuses that can affect fair com-
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pensation within the NFL. This can be true, for example,
when a player agent also represents club employees who ne-
gotiate contracts or who are involved in personnel decisions
affecting players. One abuse could be an agent "delivering" a
free agent player to a particular club because of the agent's
client relationship with a particular club official. Another
could take the form of attempting to manipulate the college
draft by pre-draft statements by the player or his agent which
they hope will deter some teams from selecting him, with an-
other club having "inside"information as to the player's actual
designs or intentions.
Club management employees, including coaches, should
therefore be advised to avoid representation by agents who
also represent players. At least one club has gone so far as to
refuse to negotiate regarding a management employee with
an agent who also represented players. We suggest that other
clubs seriously consider adopting policies directed at avoiding
these troublesome situations.
PETE ROZELLE
Commissioner
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